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## THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC PLANNING

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THE huge derision with which the Soviet Five-Year Plan was first received has in less than its own brief span of life given way to wide and exuberant worship of the idea of Planning. Many are the reasons which have helped to bring about this mass conversion. Some are economic, the search for a way out of the harrowing crisis which has hit the whole world. Others are social, the call of the masses for a saner use of our material resources. In part they are political, a chance spied by the new reaction to control the life of the people: dictatorship could not dictate without economic control. The converse is almost equally true: economic control could not control with the political means that were germane to *laissez faire*. It will be tempted to dictate. Nor could planned national systems mix with each other on the old footing of free trade. If we would commit ourselves to economic planning, therefore, we should try to anticipate what political devices would further its use and prevent its abuse. So far, the first excursions into economic planning have been conspicuously planless in their politics. At home they often have merely led to a wrangle whether it is constitutional to save ourselves or not. Abroad it has

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simply swept us back into the cockpit economics of the mercantilist era.<sup>1</sup>

Economic dealings with other States have come to be looked upon as a burden and a tribute ; and to suggest that they arise because they meet a need or promise a gain is almost a criminal offence. Yet none of the States thus injured has grimly shut itself within its own walls. They each and all merely aspire to turn the inevitable economic swing-door into a door which shall open only outwards ; for no sooner does one develop its national economy than it also envies a slice of international trade. Most economic policies thus seem to be playing a kind of Alice-in-Wonderland game of hunting what they try to escape.

This confusion makes it all the more urgent to look into the sense of the many plans which are being pressed upon us, and to do it now, before the idea common to them all is accepted. For if it is difficult to get a tariff abolished, it will be very hard to stop a system in which an army of administrators and great sections of each people will have acquired a vested interest. It is true that it was possible to do so with ease at the end of the War, but its economic controls were looked upon as part of the conduct of war itself, and it was natural that they should end with the end of the conflict ; while many of the people then in charge had been drafted from private life and were eager to return to it when its prospects were bright and the trend inclined towards private enterprise. Now the tide flows strongly the other way. That is plain from the strangely mixed company which mans the *galère* of economic planning.

Planning has always been the focal point of Socialistic theories ; it seems now as much at home in what had been hitherto the temples of ' rugged individualism.' The lan-

<sup>1</sup> Editorial Note : Readers may be referred to the argument in Bernhard Laum's *Die Geschlossene Wirtschaft* to which Dr. Mitrany draws attention in his review of the book in this issue (p. 425), where it appears that the accumulated strength due to segregation in the Autarchic State "... only results, when the time is ripe, in a ' more elemental assertion of the urge to expansion.' "

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guage heard in some of them is indeed strange to record. At the meeting of the American Institute of Steel Construction (in which are associated one hundred and sixty-six major engineering concerns) in October 1932, both its President, Mr. Charles N. Fitts, and its executive director, Mr. Charles F. Abbott, 'scored' the lack of laws restricting competition. "This situation," they said, "is a damaging accusation of the narrow policy of our legislators, who enact laws to guarantee the freedom of competition, but offer no assistance to those who are forced into bankruptcy because of ruthless competition."

At the same time, while industry and finance are drifting into socialism, Socialist Labour is perhaps as unwittingly acquiring a nationalist temper. Having started as groups of intellectuals, Socialist parties have grown into huge parties of industrial workers. As such they have a national standard of living to protect, all the more so as since the War the worker has increasingly been hemmed in within the bounds of his own country, as much or more through the action of his own class as through the action of the bourgeoisie. Moreover, during the rapid advance in the years after the War large sections of workers lost their proletarian character, while Labour leaders have had a growing share in government and, in that function, have frequently had to set aside international ideals for national claims.

In addition there is, so to speak, a compensating relation between the growing socialism of the State and the *étatisme* of the Socialists. The more the State has to give, the greater the interest in the State of those who stand to receive. For all these reasons the reputed international outlook of the working masses can now hardly be counted upon as an active political force ; and from an international standpoint there is little that distinguishes the economic plans of Labour parties from the plans of capitalist groups, even without going to the curiosities of the German National-Socialist movement for evidence. As one of its organizers declared at a pre-

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liminary meeting of the New Fabian Research Bureau, the younger movement is "interested in internationalism only in so far as it helps us to establish Socialism." And M. Montagnon, of the French neo-Socialist group, has explained in the *Œuvre* that they still believe in world co-operation as an ideal, but they realize that "the future State must be organized on national lines, as the solution of such problems as exports, tariffs, and currencies needs a strong and technically well-equipped State."

Thus the accustomed strands of political classification now appear in something like what sartorial artists call a 'heather mixture,' in which all colours combine to produce no colour at all. This alone seems to emerge clearly, that the doctrine of *laissez faire* which inspired the old Liberalism is lost for our time. In this century, and especially since the War, the idea of organization, either on a class or on a national basis, has come to dominate economic outlook. In so far as there is a conflict of views, it revolves round the type of organization. This explains, apart from details, why the demand for planning is heard at the same time from both ends of the social scale; and, in its turn, this double origin explains the two-fold hope which fills the new outlook—the hope of greater stability and of greater equality. We shall get some light on the political effects of planning by looking closer into the nature of these social and economic ends.

## II

The most fervent economic prayer of the moment is for stability—in prices, in markets, in wages, and so on. The Western world has suffered in the past from many an economic crisis, but none had led to a similar wish to put a brake on spacial and technical growth. Increased production remained throughout the main ideal. Now, however, the idea of Stabilization fills almost the whole of the profuse economic literature, and both currents, from the Right and from the Left, meet thus in a common demand for economic

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planning. But when we look into the ultimate ends which a planned economy is to serve, we find contrasts as deep as there ever were between Socialism and Liberalism. For one side merely hopes through planning to save as much as may be of its wealth and position ; but the other side wants through it to recast the whole order of things, so as to set up a truer scale of social equality.

It is the demand for Equalization, as contrasted with mere stabilization, which, so to speak, dates the movement and points to the conflict which is hidden in it. The same economic estimate lends itself to vastly differing social conclusions when it is read by the masses as the promise of an affluence of supply and by the masters as a threat of a scarcity of demand. To the latter our economic system merely seems for a moment overwhelmed by its own too great success in production. So far, attempts at planning—for coffee in Brazil ; for wheat, cotton, and oil in America ; for sugar in Cuba ; for rubber elsewhere, etc.—were all meant to reduce supply rather than gratify demand. In this sense they cannot be put in the same category with the Russian plan. Its aim is rather to develop production to the utmost, whereas in the West we have not got beyond the wish to check it. Take the case of food. Throughout the ages peoples and their rulers have been haunted by the fear of famine, and so Christianity made of the demand for ‘ our daily bread ’ its most passionate plea. Yet when that ancient and anxious prayer is at long last about to be granted, the governments of man step in and forbid the consummation of that happy state.<sup>1</sup> Even Mr.

<sup>1</sup> To measure the change that has come over us we need not go back to the pessimistic calculations of Malthus. As recently as 1898, in his presidential address to the British Association, Sir William Crookes predicted that the world would be short of wheat in 1931. It so happened that in that very year the world had the largest crop ever harvested, the greatest reserves and the lowest prices, which over vast areas were not sufficient to cover the cost of production. The appearance of certain artificial manures had sufficed to nullify the validity of Sir William's otherwise careful calculations. It has indeed been estimated that, as the result of scientific inventions and of the accumulation of capital, the world's industries are capable of producing already now 50 to 100 per cent. more than was consumed even in the heyday of prosperity.

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Keynes, it would seem, has been scared by the sight of abundance, and having replaced on his desk the picture of Adam Smith with that of Mahatma Gandhi, exclaims (in the *New Statesman*) : " Let cloth be homespun whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possible."

It is a strange state of mind—a revival of machine-wrecking iconoclasm with the blessing of scientific economists. There might have been some sense in it when it was held useful to scourge the body for the good of the soul. But ours is a super-rational and calculating age, yet we are actually destroying the corn as a means of increasing the loaves. For the attempt to check production is not justified by any proof that the peoples at large suffer from a surfeit of things. There is, on the contrary, still a patent and painful deficiency, even in regard to elementary needs, and the masses will hardly accept poverty in plenty. Curiously enough, nationalist protectionism and planning are unwittingly bringing water to the mill of Radical discontent. During the freer intercourse of the nineteenth century the supply of goods and money, and the range of wages and prices, could be represented as being conditioned by the working of commercial exchanges. But in the measure in which foreign markets are closed every country is of necessity left with the use of its own resources, no longer wanted abroad but all the more wanted at home. ' National-socialism ' expresses in a rough-and-ready way the two factors of this new equation. For the masses, therefore, the purpose of planning is rather to use to the utmost the advance in production so as to enrich and equalize distribution. No economic system and no social philosophy will last as long as the paper on which it is written if it ignores this truly crucial change in the material prospects of mankind.

Thus the two main aims behind planning, stabilization and equalization, indicate a trend towards the recasting of the economic and social structure of the Western countries. Yet there is beyond a doubt a third motive, without which

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the picture would not be complete, and which is decidedly non-economic in character. I refer to the new conception of national security. The Great War has revealed that economic power is the lever for the effective launching of military power. Economic self-sufficiency has come to be looked upon, therefore, as an integral part of the system of defence. Governments have everywhere given a hand to what have come to be known as vital industries—many and varied, for what things could be said not to be vital in war? The latest Five-Year Plan, reported from Turkey (*The Times*, January 10, 1934), was devised in consultation with the General Staff, and the new State-controlled factories are to be set up in Anatolia in places fairly safe from attack. In that sense a more or less self-contained economic system is now seen as an assurance of the State's existence, and therefore as something to be made as independent as may be of international reactions.

### III

This brief survey of the chief motives behind economic planning is of more than academic interest. Whatever the initial theory, the purpose of the plans will in the end breed the temper of the new system; but the considerate choice of ways and means may make all the difference, both at home and abroad, between co-operation or conflict during the inevitably trying process of transition. This Second Industrial Revolution, in full contrast with the first, would engage the State widely in various economic functions. Hence the State's political instruments will have to be brought into proper gear with the economic instruments if the planned system is to run smoothly towards its goal. We have enough experience to judge, in a broad way, what political means and what principles are compatible with a planned economic system, if we have but the will to amend, with open eyes, those which are not. Let us consider briefly the national aspect of this problem before looking at the international side,

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for the kind of State we shall get under a system of planning will tell the kind of relations we might expect between States.

Stabilization, our first aim, implies control. Many schemes put forward here and elsewhere try to get the benefits of stability while escaping the onus of public control, and so favour private planning, of the kind tried before with rubber, sugar, steel, and so on. But this has always failed. In times of crisis such schemes have not been enough, while in times of prosperity they have been too much. Apart from that, such cartels have dealt with one industry only, but under planning they would have to be subordinate to the wider national plan, and thus lead a precarious existence ; and much more so if they had international ramifications, when they might at any moment be upset by a change in any one of the national plans. It seems fairly clear that in so far as such plans involve a long-range programme upon a national scale, it will not be possible to apply them without a measure of public control. *One may, in fact, lay it down as an axiom that national planning means public control.* All the more systematic plans put forward in the several Western countries have, in fact, accepted the idea of State control as basic.

One may advance with equal confidence a second axiom : *that public control implies equality of treatment.* Equalization, even more than stabilization, needs the intervention of public power, be it through uniform national laws or through codes for the several industries, as imposed by the Roosevelt administration. In this case equalization is an admitted aim of the codes. But the point is that whether the drive for equality may need the support of the State or not, the intervention of the State cannot now be procured except upon a basis of general equality. This is true of every field in which the State has intervened—in the dispensation of justice as in education, in the granting of pensions as in the supply of services. It is still more inevitable in a time of emergency. The equalitarian factor played an important

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part in the working and success of war economics. Something fundamental has, after all, evolved during the past century. We may change the form of democracy, but its utilitarian substance, aspiring to "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," can no longer be denied. A different attitude could be maintained, and that but for a time, only by force; and it is significant that none of the three major European dictatorships has openly come forward as the champion of a caste or a dynasty. Even fascist dictatorships need the support of the masses, and they therefore claim, and in a measure must prove, that they are devoted to the needs of the people, upon a socially democratic basis.

At any rate, both stabilization and equalization, not to speak of security, imply the intervention of public authority. It will have to intervene to bring the plan into existence, to watch its operation, to protect it against or to combine it with other national plans. But every time authority intervenes it is faced with unexpected reactions and repercussions, with difficulties and evasions, which force it to extend the area of its action. Again we have a good deal to learn from our experience during the War, when the attempt to control prices led to control of supplies, and the control of supplies led to control of production and distribution. Every action which, so to speak, drops the stone of State interference into the pool of private enterprise produces eddies which spread in ever wider circles. And the more complex a country's economic system, that is, the greater the division of labour, the more intrusive will have to be the attempt to co-ordinate the working of the various factors and functions.

All this suggests that planning will have to be fairly comprehensive in scope, and probably compulsory in operation. It is idle to hope that any industry or service will work for the people without popular control of its work. But that need not mean still more centralized government and

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bureaucratic administration. Public control may just as likely mean decentralization—as, for instance, in the taking over from a trust of activities and services which could be performed with better results by local authorities. Planning, indeed, if it is wise, should allow the structure and working of its organs to be shaped variedly by the needs of each case. The old idea of nationalization under a government department has in any case been abandoned even by the Socialists, as may be seen from the more recent Fabian tracts. Autonomous management, through some non-representative technical board, is instead accepted equally by Mr. G. D. H. Cole, in an article on “The Essentials of Socialization” (*Political Quarterly*, July 1931), and by Mr. Harold Macmillan, a Conservative M.P., in his recent pamphlet on *Reconstruction*. An actual instance is the Central Electricity Board, set up by a Conservative government in 1926. Its capital is private, but profits are limited and shareholders have no voice in the election of officers or in the management of the enterprise; the Board is appointed by the State and—like the executive of the Broadcasting Corporation and of the new London Transport Board—is responsible to Government and Parliament only ultimately, in issues of fundamental policy. By some such means the pressure of money and also of politics may be largely eliminated.

With Radicals and Conservatives agreeing on the need to place the management of such services upon a functional basis, planning need not mean the dawn of a bureaucracy, but it must mean the twilight of parliamentarism. Parliament, or any other representative body, could only have the rôle occasionally and indirectly to lay the course of general policy. If this conclusion is far-reaching, it is by no means far-fetched. We have again the lessons of the War (closely studied in the scholarly volumes issued by the Carnegie Endowment) to show how inevitable is the eclipse of parliaments under a system of planning. Writing in *The New Statesman and Nation* (September 17, 1932) on the Labour

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Party's new financial programme, Mr. Keynes approved its economic points but claimed that politically it did not go far enough. "The less direct the democratic control," he said, "and the more remote the opportunities for parliamentary interference with banking policy, the better it will be." And again, "A planned economy will be impracticable unless there is the utmost decentralization in the handling of the expert controls." Dr. Luther gave us a foretaste of the pat argument with which parliamentary interference would be put off when, as President of the Reichsbank, he spoke in October 1932 in support of his government's economic programme. That programme, he said, must be rigidly adhered to and protected against tinkering if its promises are to be realized; and as it was a twelve-months' programme, premature criticism was in any case out of place. How much more so when it would be a matter of a five-year or even a ten-year plan! But there is here a real problem, not merely an evasion. The State of Oklahoma laid down a principle essential to any planning (and sustained by the federal Supreme Court in *Champlin Refining Company v. Corporation Commission of the State of Oklahoma*) when it decreed that "the right to take oil and to acquire ownership is subject to the reasonable exertion of the power of the State to prevent unnecessary loss, destruction or waste." The statute defined waste as including 'economic' waste. Could the specific implications of such a definition be settled by a legislature, and on perennial and universal principles? Must they not vary rather with place and time and conditions, and be estimated by experts rather than by politicians? Parliament may declare, and now and then revise, policy—and even that only within limits first staked out by the experts—but its translation into practice would have to be left to expert bodies, armed with wide autonomous powers.

Does this mean that if we copy the Soviet idea of economic planning we must accept also its methods of political dictatorship? An element of compulsion is probably inevitable in

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order to carry through such a sweeping change in our social and economic structure. But the degree of compulsion will depend on a number of factors, whose force cannot in every case be foreseen. It will depend, first, on the gap between the proposed plan and existing conditions. In Russia the change was from one extreme to another ; in the West it would be a matter rather of fairly easy adaptation. It will depend, secondly, on how severe will be the postponement of benefits, for most plans will ask from some people passing sacrifices for the sake of more lasting and general advantages. In Russia, where capital goods have to be created from nothing, the plan means an extreme and painful postponement of enjoyment. In the West it need mean hardly more than partial and temporary restrictions and, if successful, a fairly speedy increase in the well-being of the masses. Compulsion, in the third place, will depend on the degree of opposition. In Russia planning was the policy of a minority enforced upon a reluctant mass ; in the West all would depend on the measure of consent which a plan could enlist.

By its very nature and purpose planning will demand the surrender of many liberties, often more shining than solid, which at present we enjoy. Even if we may not be held to compulsory fish days, as in Elizabethan times, in order to breed sailors, we cannot expect to have planning without some guiding restraint upon the use of our time and abilities and money. Does that mean the end of democracy, or merely a re-definition of democracy ? It means that the tenets and instruments of the era of individual liberty will have to be re-adapted to the new end of social harmony. The transition will be awkward, but it need not be despotic. If planning were used merely as an attempt to give a new lease of life to our acquisitive society, then it would no doubt have to rely upon coercive means. But if it be erected fairly and squarely upon a new social outlook, upon a ' new deal,' in which rights and rewards would flow from the giving of

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service rather than from the holding of wealth, we have here ability and experience enough to create a new political alloy in which the rigours of planning would be judiciously combined with the democratic principle of consent, and a democratic definition of purpose with the autonomy of technical execution.

### IV

Whatever promise the new current may seem to hold when examined upon a national scale, it is an anxious question whether internationally such plans, as they now stand, are not as dangerous as they are fallacious. The nineteenth-century economic *laissez faire* could be naturally combined with freedom of international intercourse. But the new twentieth-century *étatisme* cannot allow such freedom. Either it will block international intercourse or it will itself organize it. At present the course would seem to be set full in the first direction. The growing number of devotees of economic planning are either indifferent or frankly hostile to the maintenance of an international economic system.

Yet one wonders how any plan could prosper—unless we give up all idea of trade among nations—if it takes no heed of the plans of other countries. How would it help to plan the production of wheat and cotton in the U.S. without regard to the plans of other countries which also produce them, and of those which consume them? A report on tin in the *Manchester Guardian* for December 15, 1933, well illustrates the point. As a result of the world restriction scheme, to which the Chinese Government is not a party, many skilled Chinese tin smelters and miners discharged from Malaya returned home and are helping to expand the Chinese industry "to a point where it may become of world importance." A perfect instance of how a truncated plan defeats its own ends! Indeed, the more nicely balanced a plan, the more easily upset by the impact of other national plans. Facts and arguments crowd into one's mind as soon

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as one applies it to this side of the problem, but suffice it here to bring forward two or three primary points.

In the first place, as things are, only two States could aspire to a closed economic system : the United States and Russia (though Mr. Redfield, in *Dependent America*, says that all the main American industries need some essential material not found in the U.S.A.). For the others, with England as a clear example, such an ideal is on a level with the wish for racial purity. The mere propounding of the idea would indeed make their chances worse. With such a spirit abroad, every State or group would tend to reserve for its own use the things which are found within its lands—as the much-discussed Memorandum on Imperial Unity prepared for the Trade Union General Council in 1930 frankly admitted. “In the case of certain products of which there is a scarcity this may involve to some extent a monopoly of such products for our own groups,” i.e. for the British Empire. Hence the adjustment of resources and activities which the international division of labour has favoured would be possible no longer. Countries rich in raw materials would claim a patent of perpetual privilege, while the less happy breeds would have to accept a state of perpetual deficiency. The ‘open door,’ now ajar, would be banged and bolted. The movement of men and money, according to the needs and opportunities of the moment, would be chained in ways already forecast by the many irksome restrictions upon immigration and the ‘star chamber’ methods through which various countries are trying to check the export of currency and the flight of capital.

National planning thus leads us straight into an ominous political paradox. Intended as a means to achieve a more rational use of material resources and a fairer division of goods among the people of a country, it would become a weapon for preventing wiser co-operation and a fairer division among the peoples of the world. Markets and materials could then be secured only by taking hold of the

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land in which they were found. The present tendency to emancipate colonies and dependencies could not continue ; nor would the important experiment of the ' mandates ' system survive long in such an acquisitive atmosphere. We should instead work back to a state of things reminiscent of the opening-up of Africa, and of which recent incidents in the Far East are a mild sample. Consider minerals alone and it is clear that other countries could not imitate the industrial pattern of America, England, and Germany without resorting to a forcible policy. If Japan, for instance, were to try to develop her heavy industry to its strength in those countries, the use of iron ore deposits in the Malay States, the Philippines, and India would become an issue of trade or of war. Self-sufficiency, therefore, will be food only for the strong and the bold ; the weak and the meek will at best only contribute the meal.

A second consideration suggests an even more disquieting paradox. In so far as a country's life were still making use of outside supplies and exchanges, the very ends of planning—stable and orderly economic life—may be stultified by unco-ordinated national planning. The present system works, after all, with a substantial margin of spontaneous co-ordination. The world's efficient means of communication and transport make it possible to forecast changes in supply and demand, in prices and costs, and so on, and to adjust them readily. But under a national planning system no such international forecast and adjustment would be possible. A government might upset all expectations in regard to either supply or demand through a sudden change of its plan : a Gandhi because he thought it good for the heart, a de Valera because he thought it good for hate. By a mere decree <sup>1</sup> it

<sup>1</sup> Two recent examples from Europe show both the possible economic effects and the political implications of such actions. English exports to France, already restricted by duties and controlled through quotas, were in 1933 further burdened with a surtax of 15 per cent., administratively imposed, to counteract, it was said, the effect of the sterling's depreciation. But though the dollar had also depreciated, no such surtax was imposed on American imports, apparently so as not to make American opinion still more unfriendly to France. Only after harsh reprisals by England was the surtax abolished. The other

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could brusquely restrict the flow of certain goods or, inversely, try to dump them without regard to cost or prices—as Russia did for a time with wheat, timber, and oil—so as to secure credits or to capture a market, or for some other reason which does not usually enter and could not be safely admitted into economic calculations. This is already amply proved in money matters. The competitive depreciation of currencies has, in fact, destroyed the very basis and meaning of money as a token of exchange. In the hands of aggressive governments it becomes a weapon of sinister potency.

Under planning most economic decisions would, in fact, be political decisions, exposing the other national units to fluctuations and to competition much more violent than under the present system. Sudden and wilful actions by 'planned' States would come to play for industry and trade the same fickle part which the weather plays in agriculture—until now the only economic activity in which to forecast is mere guessing. The nations would be exposed no longer to business cycles, but to business cyclones. This way of seeking economic security would create a state of things akin to that which prevails in regard to military security: the more drastic the plans made by each national unit for its own security, the more dubious the state of our common international security.

The Preparatory Commission of Experts of the World Economic Conference had uttered a warning on the dire consequences of "the world-wide adoption of ideals of national self-sufficiency." The one certain consequence would be infinite chaos and friction; until nothing would

instance is still more instructive. On December 20 last Mr. Walter Elliot, the Minister of Agriculture, "sprang a surprise on the House of Commons by announcing at question time plans for a further big reduction in imported meat." Imports of fat cattle from the Irish Free State for the next quarter were to be half the numbers imported in the corresponding quarter of 1932-3, and imports of beef and veal and offal were to be prohibited altogether. The purpose, no doubt, was to aid English farmers, but the "surprise was sprung" at a time of great tension between England and the Free State, and was only too likely to make "an Irish settlement still more of an impossibility." (*Manchester Guardian*, December 21, 1933.)

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better prove the need for international co-ordination than these attempts at national detachment. In an article contributed last summer to the Amsterdam *Handelsblad* Sir Herbert Samuel referred with gentle ridicule to Mr. Runciman's proposal that every country should enter into a separate agreement with every other country, in order to secure greater freedom of trade. Sir Herbert pointed out that if the sixty-six nations at the World Economic Conference were to follow that advice, over 2,200 fresh commercial treaties would have to be negotiated. Yet even that would not be the end of it. The means now favoured for the control of a planned economy is a complex of specialized boards : as each country might come to have anything from twenty to two hundred boards, and as each board in every country would enter yearly into a number of deals with similar boards elsewhere, the total number of these agreements would be nearer to 20,000 than to Sir Herbert's 2,000. Prophecy has been defined as a gratuitous form of error. Yet one may safely predict that such a mass of intersecting transactions—perhaps negotiated secretly and not solely on economic grounds—would soon reduce economic exchanges to a welter of underhand bargains and of frequent quarrels and reprisals, and make economic life the plaything of political and military, of racial and, possibly, religious 'vital interests.' In the end we should be driven to set up an international clearing house to bring some order into these offers and demands, and such an office would become a much more definite and commanding instrument of international government than the League's economic section ever dreamt of being.

Finally, if one doubts the effect of isolated national planning on economic efficiency, one must fear its effect on international peace. Under a planned economy, even if partly private, the fate of economic enterprises would be identified with the well-being of the State, for not only a particular undertaking or a particular industry but the whole

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national plan might be endangered by failure at any one point. Clearly, this new State individualism would be very different from the old. The old rested on *laissez faire* : the State left its citizens to embark upon foreign enterprise at their own will and risk, and only exceptionally used its power on their behalf. But the new individualist trend is of a fiercely mercantilist nature. The State itself would become the director of all economic life. When politics and economics become thus identified, it is difficult to see how a political power intent upon the success of its economic plans could be less acquisitive and assertive in its foreign relations than the private trusts whose competition we so often deplore.

But some people, it must be noted, entertain a contrary hope. They now favour economic isolation just because they expect it to reduce friction among nations. Mr. Keynes, for instance, in the articles of which I have spoken, abandons the old view that economic intercourse makes for peace ; he now thinks that it makes rather for quarrels and wars. Again, the *Manchester Guardian's* able New York correspondent wrote a few months ago that Mr. Roosevelt and other Americans believe that a policy of economic nationalism, each country buying and selling little abroad, would keep relations more gentle between the Powers than when they compete for markets and raw materials.

The view has been held before. It was aptly set out by Fichte in 1800, in an essay little noticed at the time and forgotten since then,<sup>1</sup> but full of the ideas now gaining currency as the latest in bold social thinking. Fichte imagined a closed socialistic State, intent upon peace and well-being at home rather than upon power abroad. Within it the utmost planned economy would reign, guided by the idea of organization rather than of law. Public power was to control every side of economic life, demanding full obedience from all. Labour was to be compulsory for

<sup>1</sup> *Der Geschlossene Handelsstaat.*

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everybody, and property, as assigned through the State, was to mean an exclusive title to certain activities and functions, not to things. He protested that his State had nothing to do with mercantilism, which wants to sell but not to buy and thus leads to a general secret trade war. His ends were social, to be obtained through a planned economy, and such an economy was possible only if not disturbed by outside interference. Hence the frontiers were to be closed and the State was to have a monopoly of the indispensable minimum of foreign trade. (Incidentally, Fichte also knew that a metallic money standard and its fluctuations might disturb his planned economy, and he therefore anticipated Mr. Keynes and Professor Irving Fisher in demanding a managed currency.) Fichte, as we see, was nothing if not logical, and the point that especially interests us is that he insisted that one condition was essential before his planned and peaceful State could work. It was essential that the State should first secure—using to this end all the means of diplomacy and, if need be, of war—its proper ‘natural frontiers’; and by that he meant such a coagulation of territory as would make the State wellnigh self-sufficient. That was difficult enough in Fichte’s time; it is much more difficult in ours. The more complex the elements which enter into the process of our material life, the more do those ideal ‘natural frontiers’ recede beyond our political frontiers.

### V

A century and a third ago the German philosopher had told all the things which the national planners have now discovered, and on the whole with greater consistency. The ideal itself is not illogical, if it be applied with the thoroughness of which Fichte was not afraid. But if a nation’s economic life is affected at all by that of other nations, there are only two ways in which adverse reactions can be avoided. A country might, if feasible, isolate itself completely. But

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if that cannot be, the only other alternative is that countries should place their mutual relations upon a basis of intelligent co-operation, as an insurance against disturbance and shock. At present we are still and elaborately dependent upon each other, and yet we play with an inconsequential economic nationalism. The curious thing is that when, after many trials and errors, we may come to see the sense of ministering to our social needs rather than to our national prejudices, we may also have reached the point when, for the first time, economic segregation could be tried reasonably. Our scientific curiosity has led the way in the making of synthetic raw materials, and our economic nationalism and the military search for 'substitutes' is speeding it up. Already we get manure from air, food from chemicals, oil from coal, rubber from plants, silky yarns from fibres and pulp, power from running water (and before long perhaps from the tides and the sun). The time is perhaps near, therefore, when everything may be produced from anything anywhere; and when any country—indeed, any province or district or city—could aspire to become self-sufficient without doing injury either to its own citizens or to others.

If this is Utopian, it is at any rate a rational Utopia. For such synthetic self-sufficiency, when it came, would be independent of our prejudices and could be practised without selfish antagonism. But national economic planning as at present envisaged, in a world so closely interlinked as ours, is Utopian in a dangerously emotional and illogical way. Why did so many writers of famous Utopias choose islands in which to place their ideal States? Because they knew that you could not create a perfect state of things in only one limb of a body, be it the body of a man or that of humanity, without a care for the fate of the other limbs. National economic planning seems at present a curious attempt to weave those dead islands of Utopia into the living fabric of our world unity.

The ultimate cause of the world's discords, put at its

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simplest, is the habit of applying to relations between States, in spite of growing intercourse and interdependence, a contrary set of principles from those which are found needful for good life within each State. Hence the evident test of the virtue of any change is this : In what manner and degree will it reduce that conflict of attitude and conduct ? As regards national planning, the answer must be that it may rather sharpen it, for it harbours within itself the germs of disruptive paradoxes and antitheses. While it is meant to achieve economic stability within the State, it is, by its very nature, likely to make worse the economic instability between States. While it aims at furthering equality within the State, it would fix and harden inequalities between States. Therefore, the hopes built upon planning as a prop to security must prove a snare and a delusion, for the very means used to strengthen national defence will much increase the strain upon it. These political implications are plain enough when one puts the case conversely. If a system for the maintenance of international peace were now solidly established, what sober nation would waste its substance and labours on producing things which it could get more lightly elsewhere ?

It is hardly true, as Mr. Keynes and others now say, that economic intercourse causes international friction. Ruthless competition does that. Hence the question we have to answer is this : Will the change from free private economy to planned State-controlled economy, without inter-State co-ordination, make that competition more or less harsh ? Some will give an answer in keeping with their own mood. Mr. G. D. H. Cole (in *British Trade and Industry*, 1932) pictured the Socialist State as a super-dumping agency forcing its goods on an unwilling world, for ends of its own. A German Professor (Wächter, *Planung, Führung, Ordnung*) envisages a ' militarized communism ' at home and a sharp competition of export bodies in the world market, made possible by the fact that in such a militarized economic

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system costs of production need not be taken into account. The use of the 'military' idea gives this view a point of exaggeration alien to our way of thinking. But the issue is put bluntly enough by both writers, and one need only accept the fact of ordinary political discipline to doubt whether the placing of economic life under the armoured wings of the State will reduce international competition, either in size or in temper. Unco-ordinated national planning would be rather like to the progress which was made in regard to fighting a long while ago, when private war among barons was replaced by public war among kings. It was a change to more orderly, more systematic mutual destruction on a larger scale and for larger ends.

This is not an argument for or against planning. Nor is it a plea either for free trade or for a World State. It is merely a claim that the peaceful and rational progress of communal life will always depend on one essential principle : on our adopting for each period that structure, political and economic, which under existing conditions can produce the richest results with the smallest friction. At present, isolated national planning would clearly do violence to an international system which is active, highly developed, and patently indispensable. We may as a consequence lose much of our liberty without gaining lasting prosperity. For in the other field, that of national politics, we must resign ourselves to the surrender of many of our individualistic habits and ways.

Is it necessary to let it come to impositions like the prohibition of all travel—except for artists and scholars, as Fichte intended, and as Frederick the Great imposed, under whom, in addition, even one term of study abroad meant the loss of all chance of civil or clerical employment—or to other such despotic extravagances? The virtual prohibition of holidays in Austria decreed by the Nazi Government last summer, the burning of books and the gagging of ideas by dictatorial rulers, are uncomfortable examples of what

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might be deemed within the rights of the State under the new dispensation. Here again, the coming change should be speeded by an intelligent distinction between what is needful and what would be arbitrary and wasteful. Whether the ultimate end of government, the development of human personality, could be safeguarded by grudging power to the new functional bodies, is very doubtful. The success of planning will probably demand rather that they be invested with the fullest technical autonomy and authority. At the same time, certain sectors of communal life—cultural and spiritual—could be properly reserved as fields which would only be devastated if uniformly ‘planned’ under a central control. The separation which has been found possible—except in Tibet and the new Germany—between politics and religion, with profit to both, could be extended also to education and art, and in general to the use of the ample leisure which technical invention promises to give us. Economic unity does not depend on personal uniformity. While the present German rulers aspire to force all sections, however distant and different, into one mental mould, the Soviet regime, from all accounts, encourages rather the idiosyncrasies of various national groups, while embracing them all strictly within the framework of a common economic plan. Instead of the division of powers customary hitherto, planning should rest therefore rather upon a sensible division of functions. It might claim full control for public authority in the organization of the nation’s material life; but it should allow the broadest devolution to individuals and groups in the community for their diverse cultural activities. Excessive and rigid control from the centre, ‘totalitarian’ rule, may otherwise harden the widespread and significant post-War recrudescence of regionalism in Europe, and in conjunction with the new possibilities of ‘synthetic self-sufficiency’ provoke, paradoxically, a trend towards the breaking up of large national States.

We are once more in the trough of a period of vital change.

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Partly it has been brought about by novel material conditions, but largely forced upon us to make good an error of our great-grandfathers. When in the decades which followed the French Revolution they set about erecting a new society, they assiduously cut off—from a natural revulsion against the constraints of their former state—the powers and functions of authority. Unhappily, though not unnaturally, since they could not know what vicious elements were hidden in the rising industrial system, they tacitly assumed that the same liberties were best also for economic life. Because they were so set upon demolishing the power of privilege, they unwittingly presented the new economic forces with the power of licence. Are we not in danger, now that we try to remedy the consequences of that mistake, of falling into the opposite error? There is a tendency abroad to assume as dogmatically that the restraints and control which we now think needful for economic life will serve equally well the needs of political life; and that, in fact, they would not work in the first unless clapped also on the second. The two sides form indeed jointly the living substance of every social body; but they can be as little fed and fostered on one and the same fare as can mind and stomach in the individual body.

It is true that this has been the habitual way of political dieting until now, but does that not explain the repeated breakdowns which have marked and marred the progress of the nations? Indiscriminate dictation so oppressed the life of the spirit that, sooner or later, it caused a revolt against the whole political system; indiscriminate licence led to such abuse of wealth and position that it always caused in time a revolt against the whole social system. If the planners should now offer material well-being at the price of spiritual constraint, we may be sure that in a generation or two the inevitable reaction will overcome them too, and sweep them away with all their works. But the certainty of that fate would in the meanwhile be poor con-

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solation for ours. What a pitiful confession of incapacity to provide reasonable government in the round, and what a tragic wastage of all the gains and lessons of modern humanism, if we should drift with the new economic experiment back into the medieval waters of the State's unsifted authority at home and unbridled authority abroad !

## NATIONAL SPIRIT AND NATIONAL PECULIARITY

*By* FRIEDRICH HERTZ

SINCE times immemorial the curiosity of travellers and the interest of thinkers have been aroused by the bodily and spiritual diversity of human races and nations. The discrepancies of religion, morals, law, customs, and temperaments observed by Greek seafarers had a most stimulating influence on the development of ancient philosophy and historiography. Since the fifteenth century, the renaissance of antiquity, the formation of national states, and the discovery of a new world have all contributed to a great increase of interest in the problem. In the eighteenth century it was cosmopolitanism and in the nineteenth century nationalism which laid great stress upon the question how national differences were to be explained and appreciated. While in old Greek literature the interest was mainly theoretical, in modern times a practical attitude towards national individuality has become more and more preponderant. The aim of theoretical enquiry is the description, understanding, and explanation of national diversities; the practical attitude consists in a passionate support or rejection of certain traits considered to be 'national' or 'anti-national.' Theoretical and practical interest in national character are not necessarily united. National feeling is often even opposed to striving for a theoretical understanding. Most nationalists believe that the national character is a mystical being which must be held in reverence and not be analysed by cold reason.

In spite of an enormous literature devoted to the national character, its nature, its causes, and its very existence are still a matter of the greatest dispute. Earlier times were apt to consider the national spirit almost exclusively as a product

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of nature and therefore as unchangeable. Writers of the eighteenth century regarded it mainly as a product of the form of government and society, and therefore rather liable to change. This latter was mainly the view of David Hume, who says that the English, of any people in the world, have the least of a national character. He gives as reasons for this the mixed character of the British constitution and the great liberty which every man enjoys to display the manners peculiar to him. In the nineteenth century the doctrine of evolution, as worked out by natural scientists, furthered the idea that national diversities were due merely to different phases of development and that all nations would gradually pass through the same stages. This view relied mainly on arguments borrowed from philosophy, natural history, and ethnology. At the same time, historical thought tended to show that national character was a product of history and that evolution in history was different from that in nature. This historical view has recently gained ground even in the field of ethnology, through the schools of the 'Kulturkreislehre' and diffusionism. How fruitful the treatment of the problem from a true historical standpoint is may be seen from Ernest Barker's book on national character,<sup>1</sup> certainly the best synthetic book of its kind. Lastly, still another doctrine has been developed, first in France and then chiefly in Germany, ascribing national traits to innate and unchangeable race qualities.

Everyday experience seemed partly to affirm and partly to refute the existence of a national character. While superficial observers were mainly struck by the strangeness of certain foreign habits, others with a more intimate and sympathetic knowledge of foreign nations were often apt to state that there were no deep-going diversities at all, but only different outward forms of little real importance. On the other hand, every student of comparative politics will admit, for example, that individuals from different nations

<sup>1</sup> Ernest Barker, *National Character and the Factors in its Formation*, 1927.

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but of the same grade of education and objectivity, will often hardly be able to arrive at the same views on a given problem, diverging in their national modes of thinking, even if the interest of their own nation is not involved.

It is obvious that this divergency of opinions is mainly due to different formulations of the question. There is, indeed, a large variety of attitudes which show little differentiation according to nations, at least among comparable nations of about the same general civilisation. But there is an equally wide range of ideas and actions differing very much even among peoples belonging to the same race, age, and cultural level. In some respects this may be due to differences in the social structure of nations, in other respects to divergencies in national tradition. We shall later on try to define these spheres more closely.

Moreover, differences of method lead to very different views. Every psychological investigation can start from either the individual or the group. Of course, strictly speaking, even group psychology can be studied only in the spiritual products of individuals, since a group always consists of individuals. But it makes a great difference whether we look at the psychological structure of an isolated individual or at the mental products of many individuals bound together in social groups. Every group, from a football club to a nation, tends to develop a special spirit, and we can even say that a group is formed by this spirit; without it, it would be only a casual agglomeration.

As a provisional definition we should say that the national spirit consists in certain ideals, wishes, beliefs, forms of thought and habits which constitute a common ground and common aims for national feeling and thereby make possible the existence of the nation. Obviously, it is mainly a product of history, embodied in traditions and institutions and liable to change. Nevertheless, the question must be studied whether natural factors and racial tendencies played a rôle in its formation and set limits to its changeableness. The

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student of history will sometimes be surprised to find how old many national traditions are, though they may have undergone a considerable development in the course of time. Again, the student of politics often observes that a national tradition is so strong that even groups or individuals opposing it come under its spell and are in some form determined by it. Such traditions may be called fundamental ones, while others are optional and may be rejected or ignored by many members of a nation.

Before investigating the national spirit more closely we must say a few words on the question, what we mean by a nation.<sup>1</sup> The concept is a most controversial one. Besides political and social interests, national differences have also contributed to the moulding of different meanings connected with this notion. Very often the word is used in a vague sense, equivalent to people or tribe, as in Bagehot's well-known book on the origin of nations. Also W. H. Rivers found little difference between nation and tribe.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, modern usage of the words nation, national, nationality, nationalism, implies that 'nation' is not at all identical with 'people.' In no way is it possible to deduce the ideas of nationalism from the mere idea of a people, nor can we substitute 'popular' or 'belonging to the people' for 'national.' 'Nation' in its specific modern sense means either a people possessing a certain political organisation and having reached a higher level of interior development, or a people in marked opposition to other peoples. In the first sense, nation specially denotes an independent, free, great, and powerful people. A few instances of usage may illustrate this. In 1704 the British Ambassador at Vienna wrote: "The Hungarian insurgents wished to treat with the Emperor not as a people of subjects, but as

<sup>1</sup> For a much more detailed treatment and a survey on literature I refer to my articles "Wesen und Werden der Nation" (*Jahrbuch für Soziologie* 1, Ergänzungsband, 1927) and "Zur Soziologie der Nation und des Nationalbewusstseins" in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft* 65, Bd. 1931.

<sup>2</sup> W. H. Rivers, *Social Organisation*, 1924, p. 32.

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a nation, having full liberty to dispose of themselves." And when Ireland regained her independent parliament in 1782, Grattan exclaimed : " I am now to address a *free people*. . . . Ireland is now a *nation*." <sup>1</sup>

Disraeli has pointed out another aspect of the idea of a nation. He says : " The phrase ' the people ' is sheer nonsense. It is not a political term. It is a phrase of natural history. A people is a species ; a civilised community is a nation. Now a nation is a work of art and a work of time. A nation is gradually created by a variety of influences—the influence of original organisation, of climate, soil, religion, laws, customs, manners, extraordinary accidents and incidents in its history, and the individual character of its illustrious citizens. These influences create the nation—these form the national mind, and produce in the course of centuries a high degree of civilisation. If you destroy the political institutions which these influences have called into being, and which are the machinery by which they constantly act, you destroy the nation. The nation in a state of anarchy and dissolution then becomes a people ; and after experiencing all the consequent misery, like a company of bees spoiled of their queen and rifled of their hive, they set to again and establish themselves into a society." <sup>2</sup> According to this statement it is the *national spirit*, embodied in institutions and in a whole civilisation, which forms the nation. A people becomes a nation by developing an individuality or personality of its own, by means of historical actions and experiences. According to this view the national will is not the same as the will of the majority of the people expressed by the ballot.

In French and German political literature the word ' nation ' is often used in a way clearly indicating that it

<sup>1</sup> A. St. Green, *Irish Nationality*, p. 208.

<sup>2</sup> Disraeli, *The Spirit of Whiggism*, 1836 (reprinted in *Whigs and Whiggism*, Political Writings by Disraeli, 1913, p. 343). Disraeli was one of the first to lay the greatest stress on the national spirit. Cf. his utterances quoted by W. Sichel, *Disraeli*, 1904, p. 57. Yet he cannot be regarded as a nationalist in the modern sense.

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is mainly glory, prestige, and power which make a people a nation. There, 'nation' is often used for designating the higher, educated, politically leading classes in contrast to the mere 'people,' by which are understood the great masses without influence. When in 1789 the third estate was assembled in Paris, a dispute arose whether the assembly should be called 'national assembly' or 'assembly of the people.' Mirabeau pleaded in vain for the latter, referring to the English and the Americans, who had always honoured the word 'people,' while the French aristocrats pronounced it with contempt. As a matter of fact, the word 'nation' has been much less used in England in order to designate the higher classes as opposed to the vulgar people than on the Continent. Very often it is simply used in England as an equivalent of 'people' or 'state,' while in France and Germany it is rarely pronounced without a certain emotional emphasis.

Whether or no a difference is acknowledged between 'people' and 'nation,' in any case a principle must be found to distinguish one nation from another. This problem is of the greatest importance for international law. Very often two or more nations contend for the possession of a territory, each one claiming the inhabitants as part of their own nation, but on the ground of different principles. Language, race, civilisation, a common character, citizenship, traditions, religion, territorial, economic or military interests are most frequently put forth as factors defining the natural boundaries of a nation. A comparative study of existing nations leads to the conclusion that it is only national sentiment which constitutes a nation and that its nucleus is the will to take part in a political and cultural community, to strive for common aims, and to share good and evil days. This will, of course, must have its roots in some of the above-mentioned factors, like a common language, traditions, territory, etc., which may enter into various combinations. It is not possible to create a nation simply

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by will, where none of those factors already form a stable groundwork. Neither are all the members of a nation always and equally conscious of this will and of its implications. In many it is only a disposition ; they simply accept facts without thinking much about the nature of their impulses, and they only become fully aware of their national sentiment in the hour of a national decision. If we speak of a ' nation ' doing or thinking this or that, we always mean only a small active part of the nation, which forms public opinion and thereby commands the following of the great masses. One of the most remarkable facts revealed by recent history is that the development of technical means of propaganda and of coercion may enable a relatively small but determined and firmly organized group to become the undisputed spokesman of a whole nation and to form the national spirit even against the most powerful national traditions.

Now national sentiment is not at all a simple matter. It is a highly complicated system of forces,<sup>1</sup> surrounded by a vast ideology, giving support to the national aspirations. The great aim of these aspirations consists in the formation of a national individuality, and the main elements of an individuality are *Unity, Liberty, Originality, and Prestige*. All national movements were and are trying to realize these aims, though in this particular nations have developed rather different modes. Thus, while all nations are striving for national liberty, what they mean by it is not the same thing. One nation may be brought to see the fulfilment of its dreams of liberty in a state which another nation may call slavery. In the same way prestige may assume very different meanings extending from mere self-respect and the feeling of being equal to others to the claim for national superiority and domination. This latter conception of prestige forms the highest aim of nationalism in its specific sense, and the term nationalism should be restricted to this meaning. In my opinion the prevailing usage of calling

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the analysis in my two articles quoted above.

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all expressions of national feeling nationalism is misleading, as if every manifestation of a social or communal feeling were to be called socialism or communism.

Originality is one of the four elements constituting an individuality, though here also the emphasis is on the subjective side. The originality may in most cases be more imagined than real, but the sociologist is concerned only with what people feel and think, not with what they ought to feel or think. Here we stand before a main source of national characteristics. To a large extent nations are different because they wish to be different. Especially, nations with an inferiority complex produced by defeat or subjection to foreign rule are most accessible to the idea that they must be free from any foreign influences, and entirely original in language, habits, political institutions, economic life, or religion. The recent history of Ireland, Germany, Italy, the Slavic states, and India furnishes astounding proofs how far this striving may prevail even against the nation's most obvious economic or cultural interests. If to-day German nationalism is showing the greatest contempt for parliamentarism and democracy, one of the motives is that these institutions are considered as foreign, imported from England and France, and opposed to the true German spirit. This, however, does not prevent the German nationalists from imitating the methods and symbols of Italian fascism, though they are absolutely alien to the traditions of their past.

Yet this tendency of national feeling to lay stress on the originality of the national character and to develop peculiar national traditions is not sufficient to explain the diversities of the national spirit. We must try to explain why national feeling has preferred certain ways and repudiated others, thus establishing fixed traditions. Moreover, we must ask whether we should comprise under the notion 'national spirit' only such traits as have been recognized by national feeling to be peculiar to the nation. Are there not many

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traits of which a nation is quite unconscious? Lastly, we must meet the question whether we can really speak of a uniform national spirit. Do we not find in every nation the most different and antagonistic modes of thought and feeling? Which then are we to attribute to the national spirit and which must we separate from it?

The last-mentioned point must obviously be discussed first. No doubt the spiritual life of a nation shows the most amazing variety of ideas and forms, and this multiplicity becomes still more abundant if we regard also the past of a nation. Most of what has been written and said on national character is inadequate because it ignores this copiousness. As a rule such statements have pleaded for a special political standpoint and they have therefore only regarded such traits as national which were in accordance with this standpoint. Liberal historians or politicians tried to show that the national character was always striving for liberty on every possible field. Conservatives dwelt in the same way on loyalty to the born leaders; democrats, and socialists on equality; clericals on devotion to God or Church; nationalists on warlike heroism and glory. In spite of this diversity of views, the impartial historian will find that in a given epoch some ideas and forms were really much stronger than others, that they dominated the rest and pervaded all fields of activity and all classes of society, or at least a very large part of the national life. The reason is that there are in every nation influential classes which possess certain ideals and habits and spread them through all other classes by legislation, education, assimilation. Everywhere their example is regarded as a model and imitated.<sup>1</sup> Yet these influential circles do not form a strict spiritual unity. Among

<sup>1</sup> The German Romanticists once believed that the customs and habits of the lower people, especially of the peasants, preserved the old Germanic forms of life, and that therefore they revealed the true national spirit. Newer research has shown that a great many costumes, usages, songs, etc., had originated in the upper classes, had been adopted by the lower classes, and were retained by them after having come out of fashion in the upper circles. Cf. the remarks of G. Steinhausen in *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* xiv (1919), p. 140.

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them are the dynasty, the aristocracy, the Church, the wealthy classes, the intellectuals, newspapers, literature, theatre, political parties, etc., each one developing a special spirit and exercising paramount influence in its proper field. This explains why ideas are simultaneously held to be 'national' which are hardly compatible in the light of criticism. In the same way the mind of every individual harbours ideals and views inconsistent with each other. A man may be a strong believer in a Christian religion preaching peace, brotherly love, and humility and at the same time a nationalist or militarist glorifying war, force, and national prestige. Sometimes there is an attempt to harmonize such contradictions by an artificial ideology, but very often the antagonism is not even noticed, or is passed over silently. Now the national character is much less a unity than the individual character. It is a common and highly misleading mistake to imagine that the national character can only be a strict unity and that traits not in conformity with one's own idea of the national spirit are not national at all and must be suppressed. The consequences can be seen in the present strivings of fascist or 'totalitarian' governments to eliminate by compulsion everything from the national life which they consider an adulteration of the national character. This idea is connected with the typical ideology of nationalists, who conceive the nation or the national state as a real living organism possessing a soul, honour, and aims quite separate from those of individuals. Moreover, the idea of the multiform national character moulded by many divergent influences is opposed to the conception of a racial soul, composed of fixed inherited tendencies which cannot be changed by exterior influences. In fact, a nation or a national spirit is not so much comparable to a single organism as to a forest or garden, full of different trees, plants, and animals and yet forming a certain unity to the eye of the forester, the botanist, the geographer, or the painter. Least of all must 'nation' be confounded with 'race' in the biological sense.

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Though the national spirit has many sides and colours, nevertheless, we can discern certain dominant traits. The national spirit is neither identical with the whole range of thought and striving produced in a nation, nor with only one spiritual current, the expression of the mythical 'Volksgeist,' nor with only those ideas which have originated on the soil of the nation or can be found only there. A great part of what we call the national spirit is either more or less due to foreign influences or has developed on about the same lines spontaneously in different nations. Not every trait must, therefore, be original to the nation. National originality mainly consists in the combination of traits which can be found in many nations or in the emphasis laid on certain traits and in a particularly strong development of them. The unity called national spirit is never more than a relative one. There is a certain relative unity in each field of culture and a certain concordance between different fields. Unity is most marked where a centralized state, church, or society prescribe standards and where they work hand in hand. To this must be added other unifying influences — tradition, economic interests, geographical factors. A small and pervious country will be more uniform than a very extended empire with many internal barriers. Economic interests make for national unity; they require a unity of currency, measures, law, usages, etc. They also tend, however, towards international uniformity and obliterate a great many old national peculiarities. The strongest traditional force is language. It is closely connected with the moulding forces of the national spirit, both as their expression and as a factor determining again thought and feeling. But the most powerful forces tending to work out national individuality are the political ones, at least as soon as a strong centralized government has developed, which seek to influence all sides of the national life. In former times, however, the power of the Church was even greater, and a good deal of national individuality

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can therefore be explained only by studying the history of the Church in relation to the cultural life of a nation.

On the other hand, there are important tracts of culture mainly dependent on individual forces which cannot be explained by the national spirit. Of course, even the strongest individuals are influenced by national traits and sometimes they may create new ones. But a good deal of their artistic, scientific, or philosophical work may be rather in opposition to the national spirit or at least independent of it. This is particularly visible in the domains of art, literature, philosophy, science. Art and literature are to a large extent a way of escaping from reality into a world of dreams, and individuality here enjoys a greater liberty than elsewhere. Therefore, many prominent historians of art and literature have quite rightly expressed great scepticism as to the widespread idea of a national genius which must be traceable in every artistic or literary achievement of a nation.<sup>1</sup> It must even be said that the highest performances of a great genius are not the expression of national peculiarity. Great thinkers and poets have their spiritual roots both in their own nation and in humanity. The national element in them is not usually what constitutes their greatness. Rather the contrary. It is the work of a great genius which may add new traits to the national spirit, though as a rule it is only a superficial and distorted view of his idea which is preserved in the national mind. Most great thinkers were cosmopolitans and relentless critics of national faults. In many countries this side of their thought is left out or minimized in the legendary image which the national spirit has formed of them.

Neither is there a strict unity in the historic development of the national spirit. It is certainly not true that the character of our ancestors 1,000 or 2,000 years ago was fundamentally the same as that of their descendants to-day.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. F. Baldensperger, *La Littérature*, 1927, p. 287; L. M. Price, *English-German Literary Influences*, 1919, p. 120.

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Many nationalists believe this to be the case, but no unbiased historian will admit it to-day. The history of civilization gives many instances of considerable and quick changes in national traits. David Hume points out with regard to religion that the English "a few centuries ago, were sunk into the most abject superstition. Last century they were inflamed with the most furious enthusiasm and are now settled into the most cool indifference, with regard to religious matters, that is to be found in any nation of the world." When Hume was writing these lines John Wesley had already begun to revive the religious spirit, and soon the religious indifference of England was a matter of the past again.

Yet a certain continuity of national traditions is undeniable. National characteristics are not of necessity permanent, but under certain conditions they may continue for a very long time, though in changing forms. Historic ideas and feelings may act on the future in different ways. Sometimes they are embodied in great figures or institutions and acknowledged as expressions of the national spirit, and then there may be an unbroken traditional chain through centuries. Goethe remarked: "Extraordinary men as great natural phenomena always remain sacred to the patriotism of the people without consideration whether they were useful or harmful." In other cases the memory of a great man, an institution, a custom or an idea gets entirely lost for a long time. Then suddenly such a tradition may be revived and interpreted as an element of the national character, sometimes in a sense very different from the original one. Numerous characterizations of national traits are to be found in ancient and mediæval writers which seem to confirm our present views of certain nations. Yet it is often very doubtful whether the likeness is not more apparent than real, and in any case such comparisons are very much exposed to the danger of being influenced by prejudices. Even such a great scholar as Theodor Mommsen has drawn

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a detailed parallel between the character of the old and the modern Celts,<sup>1</sup> coming to the conclusion that the Celts had always shown "a lower faculty for morals and culture" and a political incapacity dooming their national existence to ruin. John M. Robertson has criticized these statements trenchantly.

In spite of such pitfalls the study of early writings on national characteristics very often reveals the persistency of particular traits or at least of opinions on them. In the twelfth century Henry of Huntingdon calls the English a free and merry people; the German monk Eckehard, writing in the tenth century, says of the French, that they were by nature superior to other nations in playing with words; another German, Otfried von Weissenburg (ninth century), praises the warlike valour of the Franks, entitling them to world domination. The Germans, and later on also the French, never ceased to proclaim themselves as the true inheritors of the Frankish virtues and claims. In these cases the warlike spirit and imperialistic aims were chiefly maintained by the existence of such powerful institutions as the Roman-German Empire, the French national monarchy, and those forms of a feudal aristocracy peculiar to Germany and France. The idea that the English were a very fickle nation has many times been expressed from the eleventh to the eighteenth centuries.<sup>2</sup> Montesquieu ascribed this to the influence of their climate. Obviously the charge was based on their frequent rebellions against kings, while the later charge of perfidy was due to the consequences of the balance of power policy.

Especially numerous are typical judgments on neighbouring peoples, tribes, or towns.<sup>3</sup> Neighbours have always fought and abused each other. Vilifications of this kind

<sup>1</sup> Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte* v, ch. 7. Cf. John M. Robertson, *The Saxon and the Celt*, 1897, pp. 190 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Many opinions on German peoples current in the Middle Ages are quoted by W. Wachsmuth, *Geschichte der deutschen Nationalität*, 1860, vol. i, pp. 126, 159.

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very often have no more value than the usual national self-praise. More important may be the pictures of nations drawn by impartial foreign observers and by travellers who have had the opportunity of comparing different peoples by studying them in their respective countries. Many ancient writers were interested in such descriptions, but their reports can seldom be referred to modern nations because the tribes mentioned by them disappeared in the time of the great migrations and have been merged in newer peoples. About the origin and composition of these new peoples we often know too little to be able to use the testimonies of the ancients on their forerunners. Very frequently also ancient sources have not been read with sufficient caution. The most notable example is the *Germania* of Tacitus, who gives an idealized description of the old Teutons, directed against the depravity of Roman civilization, just as Rousseau and his contemporaries praised the noble savage in order to criticize the spirit of their age. The discovery of the only extant manuscript of the *Germania* in the fifteenth century has had an enormous influence on the development of German national sentiment. A good deal of the unlimited self-praise peculiar to modern German nationalism, and constituting one of the strongest traits of the present German spirit, is due to the uncritical exploitation of Tacitus' *Germania*.

In the Middle Ages one of the oldest sources is the great encyclopædia of the English minorite Bartholomeus Anglicus (about 1240), containing notes on the peculiarities of different peoples in a great part of Europe.<sup>1</sup> Most interesting are two tracts by Jordanus of Osnabrueck and Alexander of Roes, published 1281 and 1288. The authors describe the French and the German character in a way that shows striking coincidences with the views held by public opinion to-day. The second tract *Noticia saeculi* also contains a whole theory

<sup>1</sup> Cf. for text and comments Anton Schönbach, "Des Bartholomeus Anglicus Beschreibung von Deutschland," *Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, Bd. 27, 1906.

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concerning national differences.<sup>1</sup> Each nation has an innate fundamental instinct, the Italians the economic desire, the Germans the desire for domination, the French the desire for knowledge. Therefore in Italy the people rule, in Germany the warriors, in France the clerks. Everywhere the ruling class moulds the character of all other classes. From these fundamental instincts spring a great many qualities, described by the authors. Their aim is to defend the German claim to World-domination against the French. Later on, Humanism produced a great many descriptions of this kind.<sup>2</sup> Especially important was a book by Joannes Boemus, *Omnium gentium mores, leges et ritus* (Augsburg, 1520), of which in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries forty-three editions appeared. Later on, John Barclay had an equal success with his *Icon animorum* (London, 1612), which has been reprinted many times. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries produced countless writings on the national character, mainly dwelling on its explanation, while the older books had been more descriptive.

It is necessary to distinguish three kinds of descriptions of the national character. First of all, each nation has formed an image of its own character in which, of course, the virtues are conspicuous. Secondly, each nation has a traditional picture of the character of other nations, especially of its enemies. To these two subjective views can be added a strictly scientific one, based on an analysis of the whole history of a nation. This latter may produce a picture quite different from the traditional one. Thus, it is firmly believed in Germany that loyalty (*Treue*) was the specific German virtue. Yet the state of Germany, especially in the Middle Ages, bordered on anarchy for many centuries, and showed much less loyalty than the contemporary history of England and France. Nevertheless, subjective views must not be disregarded. Partly because they may contain an

<sup>1</sup> Cf. text ed. by Wilhelm in *Mitteilungen des Instituts f. öster. Geschichtsforschung*, xix, 1898.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Erich Schmidt, *Deutsche Volkskunde im Zeitalter des Humanismus und der Reformation*, 1904.

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element of truth, though they will rarely express it adequately; partly because they play a rôle as factors moulding the national character. The idea that a nation has inherited from its ancestors a special inclination or aptitude—however inconsistent with real facts it may be—leads in any case to the elevation of this trait to the rank of a national ideal, directing thought and action. Even less laudable traits are often idealized in this way. The songs of German students celebrate beer drinking as an old Germanic virtue, and the students who are obliged by strict custom to show their courage by duelling are convinced that this, too, was a trait of their Teutonic forefathers, though this belief has no historic foundation at all.

The distinction of different forms of the national spirit answers our former question whether only such traits are to be considered as national ones which are recognized by public opinion as such. Our view is that we must distinguish between two different spheres of motives influencing the formation and destinies of a nation and thereby deserving the designation 'national.' There are first of all the habits and ideals which a nation acknowledges as national, as, for instance, the habit of wearing a special costume,<sup>1</sup> the tradition of speaking the national language, the ideals of personal liberty or of imperialism, or the methods of rational thought or irrational intuition. Most of these traits are considered valuable and some are felt to be national duties, while some are assumed to be national faults (e.g. particularism or internationalism) and some to be neither good nor bad. This we should call the conscious national spirit. It consists

<sup>1</sup> Costumes, etc., played a large part as tribal distinctions in early times. The Visigoths retained their furs in the warm climate of Southern France till the end of the fifth century. Charlemagne forced Grimoald in 788 to promise by oath to suppress the national chin-beard of the Langobards. Cf. F. G. Schultheiss, *Geschichte des deutschen Nationalgefühls*, 1893, vol. i, pp. 35, 75. One of the founders of German nationalism, Fr. L. Jahn, in 1808 laid great stress on uniforming the whole people in a special German costume with distinctions for different ranks, ages, etc. (Jahn, *Deutsches Volksthum*, 1817, p. 258). Modern nationalism has everywhere attracted great masses of followers by giving them uniforms. Most nations also praise their national dishes and ridicule the food of other nations.

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in the ideal of a national character formed by national sentiment, and in a great many auxiliary ideas, serving its purposes. The tendencies of national sentiment itself differ much in different nations. On the other hand, there are many mental factors, sometimes powerfully determining the fate of a nation, which are never generally and adequately realized as such forces, and which, therefore, could be called the unconscious national spirit. Such forces are often not admitted to be national traits because either they do not flatter national pride or because they are inconsistent with other fixed views on the national spirit. In many cases also important national traits do not become generally conscious because it is too difficult to notice their existence and to grasp their true meaning save for a specially trained scientific investigator. Many national peculiarities are due to the fact that some classes, professions, stages of age, or other special groups exercise a much stronger influence on national destinies than in other nations and that they have also developed in each nation a specific mentality, differing from the mentality of the same group in another nation. Examples are, the preponderance of the military class and the agrarians of the Junker-type in Prussia and Prussianized Germany, or the influence of the commercial spirit and of the gentry on English life, that of the small middle class and of the small saver on French politics, the position of women in American education, that of youth in modern Germany. Facts of the latter sort are usually not quite ignored by public opinion, but they are seen in another light than that of an objective investigation. Germans are utterly opposed to the view that the existence of a privileged military class has had a decisive influence in moulding the public mind in Germany ; they rather assume that warlike valour and heroism are innate qualities of their race and that the system of a ' nation in arms ' is only the expression of the race character. According to them there is no militarism peculiar to Germany, for other nations too have big armies, a general staff, etc.

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Historians and sociologists attempt to determine the mental forces springing from the social structure and the past of a nation and may to some extent be able to come to generally accepted views. But the subjective national spirit does not consist in only one ideology. Different classes, parties, religious or regional groups hold different views of the national character, and some may hold none at all. Yet there will generally be a certain common opinion among them too, though different parties may appreciate the same traits differently. Always it is national sentiment which forms the image of a national spirit, and as this sentiment claims to be 'totalitarian' to-day, it is trying to lay hold of as many features of the national life as possible and to exploit them for the purposes of the fourfold national striving. In this way an enormous ideology has been developed, comprising history, philosophy, social sciences, folk-lore, art, etc., with a view to elaborating a picture of the nation in all its activities and to ascertaining its peculiar character. In this ideology views on the character of other nations have also a prominent place.

The power of this national ideology can hardly be over-rated. It has proved infinitely stronger than economic considerations or moral principles. It has been an insurmountable barrier to any real international understanding and co-operation. Not all tenets of this ideology are equally potent, and some are not even really believed at all by the more enlightened members of a nation, though even these will carefully avoid confessing this, or doing anything which might cause their national orthodoxy to appear in a doubtful light.

Between the 'private' and the 'national' soul of the same individual there may be the greatest possible contrast. Privately he may be the most peaceful, reasonable, faithful, tender-hearted person, while in affairs regarded as national the exact opposite. Unfortunately, the enormous majority of people seem absolutely unable to understand this very

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simple difference. Either they conclude: As this nation is generally held responsible for horrible acts, every individual belonging to it must be a barbarian. Or they conclude the other way round: As the individuals of that nation, I know, are well educated, nice and honest people, their political system must also be all right. They do not realize that every national ideology is like a pair of spectacles and may give a totally distorted view. It may make wrong look right or cruelty appear as humanity. Or it may, on the contrary, arouse illusions concerning the possibilities of an international understanding which no sensible individual under comparable circumstances in his private life would harbour. The mixing up of private and national character is especially marked in nations in whose national character rationalism and individualism are strong. Their members find it difficult to conceive that reasonable individuals should be so subject to the irrational compulsion of a mystical national spirit that they could completely change their whole character in an instant.

It has already been said that some national traits can actually be traced through many centuries back into the past. This also creates an impression in favour of a wrong individualistic interpretation of national characteristics. It seems so obvious that in such a case the racial character of the individuals is the cause of the astounding persistency. Moreover, this theory again calls forth the tendency to interpret the whole past in the light of race stability, and vague or obscure indications of old sources are twisted till they fit in. Theories explaining the mental diversities of peoples by the temperament of individuals were put forth by ancient writers like Pseudo-Hippokrates, Aristoteles, Galenus, Ptolemaeus.<sup>1</sup> Yet the Greek and Latin authors attributed this temperament not to an innate character but to the influence of the climate or of the stars, and it does not

<sup>1</sup> Cf., on these ancient theories, my article in the *Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie* iv, and on mediæval and modern theories of this kind, my articles in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*, 54 Bd., 1926.

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become clear from their writings whether they believed that these influences produce inheritable traits. The explanation of temperament by climatic influences was revived by Bodin and accepted by many writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. David Hume was one of the first to point out its weak sides and to emphasize social and racial factors. An advance towards a more accurate sociological explanation comes with the anthropo-geographical theories which begin with Thucydides and Strabo and are continued by Montesquieu, Herder, Ritter, Buckle, Ratzel, and many others. Anthropo-geography lays stress on the influence of geographical conditions on the social life of peoples, which again determines their mentality. Geographical conditions, however, do not necessarily bring about a particular mentality; they only give an opportunity for the development of certain social traits. There is a good deal of truth in these explanations, though they are not sufficient to elucidate all sides of the national spirit. Finally, Count Gobineau, Vacher de Lapouge, H. St. Chamberlain, H. Günther, and others have tried to assign the first place in the explanation of national differences to inherited race tendencies. These views are mainly held by pan-Germans and are shared by some American writers, obviously for political purposes.<sup>1</sup>

Of these explanations both the climatic and the racial theories try to deduce the collective from the individual character. Most of their assertions are not in accordance with scientific research. Especially, the pan-German race-doctrines have no scientific basis at all in spite of their arrogant claim to be a revelation of the highest order. We should not deny altogether that climate and inherited temperament may have some importance in contributing to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. my book *Race and Civilisation*, 1928, and my article "Rasse" in the *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie*, ed. by Vierkandt. W. MacDougall (*The Group Mind*, 1921) emphasizes the contrast between English individualism and French anti-individualism, submissiveness to authority, and doctrinairism, which he regards as innate tendencies of the Nordic and Alpine races. But the Northern Germans are certainly close relatives of the English, and yet they are more submissive to authority, more doctrinaire and anti-individualistic, than the French ever were.

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the formation of the national spirit. But before this can be ascertained we must first get a much clearer and safer view of the real peculiarities of peoples. We must first be sure of the facts which are to be explained instead of explaining the nature of national traits which exist only in our fancy. The weak point in most of the race theories is that they start from very strongly biased views on the character of certain peoples. The Nordic race appears as the quintessence of all virtues, the masterpiece of creation, while the other races are rubbish. The representatives of these theories all lack adequate historical and sociological knowledge. They usually commit the most naïve blunders in describing the culture of races, and they constantly suppress embarrassing facts and distort others in a monstrous way. Therefore, we hold that before an analysis of history as to the action of racial forces is possible, we must first get a much more adequate view of what is peculiar to each race, if this be possible at all. Nowhere in history can we observe pure races; we find only peoples or nations composed of different racial elements which can hardly be separated. For this reason our investigation must be turned on to the national spirit and by a comparative method we might possibly ascertain residues explainable only by racial factors.

The task of working out a really scientific account of national individuality without indulging in a premature search for the ultimate causes of differentiation has been tackled by many historians, though as a rule only incidentally and for historic phenomena of limited range. Sometimes the whole history of a people has also been represented from this standpoint. In France a great many scholars have based their studies on the idea of the national spirit.<sup>1</sup> Henri

<sup>1</sup> For the subsequent statements, cf. Gabriel Hanotaux, *Henri Martin*, 1885, p. 292; Eduard Fueter, *Geschichte der neueren Historiographie*, 1911, p. 549; A. de Tocqueville, *L'ancien régime et la révolution*, 1856, p. 321; Cénac Moncaut, *Histoire du caractère et de l'esprit français*, 3 vols., 1867-8; P. Lacombe, *La psychologie des individus et des sociétés chez Taine*, 1906; Paul Scippel, *Les deux Frances et leurs origines historiques*, 1905; Alfred Fouillée, *Psychologie du peuple français*, 1898; *Esquisse psychologique des peuples Européens*, 5 ed., 1914, and other books of this author.

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Martin wrote his great *History of France*, first published in the thirties and in its final form in the fifties of the nineteenth century, with the leading idea that the Gallic soul has remained the same through all ages. This idea is shared by Alexis de Tocqueville, who says that the French people are so unalterable in their principal instincts that they can still be recognized in portraits painted two or three thousand years ago. Cénac Moncaut was the author of a comprehensive history of the French national character. This idea plays a decisive rôle in the works of Hippolyte Taine, especially in his *History of English Literature* (1863) and his *Notes sur l'Angleterre*. Paul Seippel tried to show that through the whole history of France two antagonistic types of character, the authoritarian and the revolutionary, can be traced, which, however, emanate from the same source, namely, from the spirit of the late Roman Empire kept alive by the Church. Also Alfred Fouillée has contributed very valuable studies on this subject. In France the older theories on the influence of nature on the national character have maintained themselves especially long; thus Boutmy in his *Political Psychology of the English People* (1903) says that of all factors, natural forces have the greatest influence on the character of a people. In England also, historians have made use of the idea of a permanent national character, though apparently less so than in other countries.<sup>1</sup>

By far the greatest development, however, of the idea of national peculiarity has taken place in Germany. Here the Romantic movement in opposition to the rationalism of the eighteenth century dwelt on the national spirit which was often considered as a mystical being, the *Volksgeist*, not susceptible of rational explanation. The Germans are even convinced that their romanticists were actually the first to discover and emphasize nationality and national individuality, but this is an astounding mistake and can be regarded only

<sup>1</sup> Cf. John M. Robertson, *The Saxon and the Celt*, 1897, and other writings of the same author who combats specially the racial theories.

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as a part of German national ideology. As a matter of fact, the wonderful unfolding of German culture in the second part of the eighteenth century was in very large measure due to the influence of foreign, especially English, ideas. Among them the idea of the free development of the original genius as a condition of true art was paramount. In the political field these ideas led to the liberalism and cosmopolitanism of Kant, Schiller, and other great classics. Now, the French Revolution provoked a strong reaction in favour of absolutism and even feudalism. German Romanticism and Hegelianism largely became the philosophy of this reactionary spirit. Rationalism, "enlightenment," liberalism were combated as foreign imports, alien to the mystical German soul. They were to be replaced by an absolutely original German culture. From this time onwards the idea of national individuality and originality haunted German writers more than those of any other nation, and it gave rise to an enormous literature treating of these questions. Only a part of these books has a scientific character, and of these we can mention only a very few. Among the older writers E. M. Arndt, Heinrich Riehl, and Bogumil Goltz were remarkable.<sup>1</sup> Many distinguished historians have written the history of German culture with the purpose of showing the development of the peculiar national spirit.<sup>2</sup> Among them may be mentioned Gustav Freytag, who said that 2,000 years of history have altered German character much less than one would think. Also, Gustav Steinhausen regarded the history of culture as the history of the soul of a people. G. Dehio's great *History of German Art*, J. von Moser's *History of German*

<sup>1</sup> On the theories of E. M. Arndt, cf. my article in the *Forschungen zur Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*, vol. iii, 1927. On Riehl, cf. Fueter, p. 568. Cf. B. Goltz, *Zur Geschichte und Charakteristik des deutschen Genius*, 2 vols., 1864 (first 1859).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Gustav Freytag, *Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit* (first ed. 1859), W. Wachsmuth, *Geschichte der deutschen Nationalität*, 3 vols., 1860-2; G. Steinhausen, *Geschichte der deutschen Kultur*, 3 ed. 1929; interesting materials are to be found also in G. Grupp, *Der deutsche Volks- und Stammescharakter im Lichte der Vergangenheit*, 1906; H. Floerke, *Deutsches Wesen im Spiegel der Zeiten*, 1916; R. Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie des deutschen Menschens und seiner Kultur*, 2 ed. 1929; E. Hurwicz, *Die Seelen der Völker*, 1920.

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*Music*, and numerous other books pursue the same aim, while J. Nadler in his *History of German Literature* lays stress on the peculiar character of German tribes and provinces.

Historians are very often so strongly impressed by the intricate nature of national traits that they abstain from expressing views on their origin and development. They rather accept the existence of a national spirit as a given fact without venturing upon theoretical explanations. Characteristic is the attitude of Leopold von Ranke, who said that the essence of the national spirit can only be felt but not understood. It is a 'spiritual air,' permeating everything.<sup>1</sup> Another great historian, Karl Lamprecht, believed that nations were passing through typical phases of spirituality, constituting stages of age.

If history is not to be a mere accumulation of facts without leading idea, or a mere art of painting historic portraits, the problem of the national character cannot be evaded. Its solution requires, in our opinion, a combination of historical and sociological methods. The conscious national spirit is mainly the idea of their own nation which the groups forming public opinion have worked out, but its largest part these groups have received as traditions from their forerunners. The task, therefore, is to study both group-psychology and the traditional element in the history of ideas and habits in all fields, as well in politics and in economics as in law, religion, literature, philosophy, art, education. Ideas are embodied in institutions, in law and customs, in literature of every kind, and in works of art. Yet it is not sufficient to rely exclusively on sources where ideas are formulated most consciously and impressively. They must be studied in their relations with social groups, in their minds, habits, and doings. Moreover, some historical epochs have left particularly strong marks on the national spirit, both the conscious and the unconscious one. First of all, the foundation of a state creates a political

<sup>1</sup> A. Gasparian, *Der Begriff der Nation in der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung des 19. Jahrhunderts*, 1918.

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and social groundwork which is hardly ever completely washed away by the floods of time, especially if it is supported by the configuration of the soil and the aptitude of the population to be welded together. This initial act also forms a certain structure and spirit of the classes and certain relations to the neighbouring nations which then affect the whole course of history. In this way the foundation of the Frankish empire by the Merovingian kings more than a thousand years ago is still a dominating force in German and French politics. Even if an empire is disrupted and disappears entirely as a state, its tradition may remain a living power. The traditions of the Roman Empire still exercise their spell on a great part of Europe. Up to quite recent times Germany, Austria, France, Russia, Italy, claimed to be the legitimate successors of this Empire, and the claim has now only changed its name and title. Moreover, the Empire survives in the Roman Church, and in Roman law, which has become the basis of many modern codes. Illustrious French writers, like Edgar Quinet, Hippolyte Taine, Fustel de Coulanges, Paul Seippel, held the view that the French spirit was mainly the product of old Rome. At present Fascist Italy is doing everything to revive the glory and the pride of Imperial Rome in the hearts of all Italians. It is an ironical fact that even Hitler's brownshirts salute with the same lifting of the arm which was the salute of the Roman legions, smashed by the old Teutons in the Teutoburg forest. Obviously the spirit of this Germany is more akin to that of Roman dictatorships than to the indomitable individualism and sense of liberty of the old Teutons.

Other epochs which contributed much to the formation of the national mind are those which are considered the most splendid ones by the nation. Usually these are the epochs in which the states reached their greatest power and prestige in politics and sometimes also had the greatest splendour in culture. In England it is the Elizabethan age and the eighteenth century ; in France the age of Louis XIV, the

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Revolution and Napoleon ; in Germany the age of Frederic II and Bismarck ; in Austria that of Prince Eugene. It is of great significance for the national spirit, which ages and which great figures are most alive in the mind of the people.

The task outlined above requires special methods. We only wish to indicate that a comparative method seems to be very promising. A main fault of many previous attempts to get an accurate view of the national spirit was that its students restricted themselves to the history of one nation. This caused them very often either to consider certain traits as quite peculiar to this nation which were really common to many nations at some stages and which perhaps had even been imported from abroad, or to overlook the very features characteristic of the people on which their interest was concentrated. No doubt such a comparative study of different nations is beset with the greatest difficulties. Yet it is possible to overcome them and to achieve by means of this method a real progress towards the solution of this momentous problem.

## HIERARCHICAL ORGANIZATION

*By* C. A. MACE

**I**T is a significant fact that social groups of the most diverse kinds tend to assume a hierarchical form of organization. Hierarchical structure is found, in germ at least, in every kind of community, and in every association which exceeds a certain minimal size and enjoys more than an ephemeral existence. Commonly, of course, this structure is a matter of deliberate policy, consciously designed and embodied in a formal constitution; but its roots run deeper than this. The formal constitution, it would seem, merely accords explicit recognition to the dictates of our nature.

Certain qualities of mind and character, in respect of which individuals differ, provide the ultimate basis for a hierarchical order in society, whilst this order in turn determines further individual differences in mind and character. It constitutes the stable, though not unchanging, structural basis for most if not all of the primary social functions of which the social theorist tries to present a systematic view. Such, at any rate, is the thesis here briefly to be defended.

As to the nature of these qualities of mind and character there is no dearth of plausible suggestions. Therein precisely the difficulty resides. A hierarchical constitution might have come about in so many different ways. The problem is to ascertain how, in fact, it has arisen in the actual social groupings with which the sociologist is concerned.

The relations in virtue of which individuals form a group must, it is generally agreed, be sharply distinguished from merely logical and from merely physical relations. Similarity will generate a class in the logical but not in the sociological sense. Individuals in proximity will constitute a mass but not a social group. In the last analysis the relevant relations are psychological. They are, in fact, 'ties,' modes of linkage

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of which the proverbial 'family ties' are but a special, albeit particularly obvious, example.

But not every psychological relation has the properties of a tie. Some are inherently disruptive. Others are merely neutral and devoid of socializing effect. Even the consciousness of kinship or of kind is an instrument of cohesion only in so far as it entails some further relation of an affective or conative kind. There are reasons to suppose that all the bonds of sociability are bonds of propensity or purpose. Again, not every tie which generates a group produces hierarchical organization, but only those which beget supra-, sub-, and co-ordination. These considerations narrow down the field of exploration; but even so the social theorist may well experience embarrassment at the possibilities of choice. There are many ties productive of hierarchical organization, and in general they operate in complementary pairs. Parental devotion finds reciprocation in filial piety, 'self-assertion' in the leader is met half-way by 'self-abasement' in the disciple, anger seeks its satisfaction in the evocation of fear. We can conceive, in consequence, an immense variety of types of social structure which differ in their organizing ties. The question therefore remains: which of these abstractly possible agents is to be invoked as the primary source of organization in the existing social groups with which we are familiar?

It will be a convenience of method, in the exploration of this question, to begin with a patent oversimplification—to formulate a provisional hypothesis and from this to proceed by correction and elaboration. For this purpose we cannot do better—in fact, we can hardly do otherwise—than take as our point of departure the doctrines of McDougall; for nowhere else do we find so complete a psychological theory specifically designed for application to the facts of social life. According to the well-known thesis of this author, man is endowed with a small set of primary tendencies, propensities, or 'instincts.' An instinct is conceived as predisposing us

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selectively to perceive and attend to certain objects or situations, to be emotionally excited by these objects in specific ways, and to experience an impulse in their presence towards more or less specific lines of action. These predispositions admit of modification both on the side of reception and on the side of response, the emotive core alone remaining constant. They admit also of a distinctive type of organization inasmuch as two or more instincts may come to be attached in a systematic way to the idea of some object—one's self, one's dog, or one's country. An organized disposition of this kind constitutes a 'sentiment.' With the completed theory of the primary instincts, the doctrine of modifications, and the doctrine of the sentiments we have (apart from certain secondary considerations) the essential conceptual apparatus provided by McDougall for explaining the motivation of all the more important facts of social life.

Within the framework of this system there are several instincts which might with plausibility be invoked to account for hierarchical organization, but it is obvious that the main burden of explanation will fall upon the two complementary tendencies described as self-assertion and self-abasement. In any natural social grouping, it is tempting to suppose, these proclivities will be unequally distributed in respect of relative strength. Whilst everyone experiences both the impulses of assertion and of abasement, the degree to which one of these predominates will vary from man to man. Accordingly there would be a tendency for each of us to gravitate to a position in which his rank is adjusted to the degree in which he exhibits the will to lead and the willingness to be led.

The picture of such a society is at least instructive in correcting the crude psychology of leadership which simply dichotomizes the world into shepherds and sheep. The popular conception of the leader applies no doubt with a certain obvious truth to some special cases in the higher ranks, but it fails to do justice to the facts of leadership exhibited in the humbler walks of life. Leadership is not so much a

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quality which is simply present or absent, and vested solely in individuals; it is a quality which varies in degree and is diffused in various ways throughout the whole of the body politic.

Society, of course, is not to be explained merely in terms of supra- and sub-ordinating relations. It is bound by horizontal as well as by vertical ties. We must therefore incorporate in the picture the important suggestion of Professor Bartlett<sup>1</sup>—that equally fundamental with assertion and abasement are the relations of 'primitive comradeship.' This yields, as the foundation of hierarchical order, a trio of instinctive tendencies: a complementary pair which organizes the relations of leaders and disciples and a single symmetrical tendency towards co-operation between co-ordinate members in the social order.

But the whole theory, valuable and suggestive in some respects for a preliminary analysis, fails to do justice to the complexity and the plasticity of actual social life, and it is infected with a certain vagueness at certain crucial points. More serious even is the fact that it rests upon a special conception of 'instinct' which critical reflection and empirical research have in recent years done much to undermine.

It has become increasingly apparent that under the single term 'instinct' psychologists have frequently combined, and perhaps not infrequently confused, two very different notions. On the one hand an instinct has been regarded as a special kind of reactive tendency, and on the other as a species of appetite, propensity, or drive. By a reactive tendency is here meant—without any assumption as to its physiological basis or its ultimate explanation—any well-defined disposition to respond in a specific way to some specific mode of stimulation. The concept has been applied to an immense range of conduct, innate and acquired, individual and social, but throughout the field of its application two essential characteristics are implied: (i) the response is evoked by a positive,

<sup>1</sup> *Psychology and Primitive Culture*, ch. 2.

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approximately specific and generally external, stimulus; (ii) this response itself is specific and works itself out in an almost unvarying way irrespective of the effects produced.

An appetitive tendency differs from a reactive tendency in both of these respects. Appetitive action commonly occurs in the absence of external stimulation and may be evoked by the purely negative situation which corresponds to the immediate consciousness of deprivation or want. The response to deprivation will assume, according to circumstances, widely differing forms, and activity persists until there is produced a certain terminal state—one that remedies deprivation or satisfies the want.<sup>1</sup>

When this distinction has been drawn it becomes clear that the appetitive tendencies of the instincts, both in their ends and in the conditions which call them into play, are highly general or non-specific. It is, in fact, inaccurate to describe a child's expression of fear in the presence of a dog as a pure manifestation of instinct. At most, the native disposition is to react to a situation the character of which can be described only in very comprehensive terms. We may say, perhaps, that there is an instinctive tendency which expresses itself in some form or other of flight, concealment, or defence in the presence of anything which, in any way or for any reason, appears to be dangerous. If the first thing conforming to this description happens to be a dog, the reaction occurs, but not in virtue of the distinctively canine qualities in the stimulus. It occurs in virtue of those more elusive properties which a dog may share in common with a locomotive or a clap of thunder. When the irrelevant features are deleted from the description of the instinctive tendency all that is left is a very general and almost platitudinous formula. To assert the existence of an instinct of flight is simply to assert that we are

<sup>1</sup> A modification of McDougall's general system based upon such considerations has been suggested by Professor Campbell Garnett. Unfortunately, the clear lines of the fundamental antithesis have been blurred in this author's account by the introduction of a secondary distinction between appetites in the narrower sense and instinctive tendencies. Cf. *The Mind in Action*.

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disposed to avoid objects which appear to us to be dangerous. To say that there is an instinct of pugnacity is simply to say that we are disposed to resist and to overcome obstruction.

A further consideration which detracts from the explanatory value of the concept of an 'instinct' arises from the doctrine of modifications. An instinct is modified (i) inasmuch as it may come to be evoked in a novel way, and (ii) inasmuch as it may come to be directed to the attainment of a novel end. It follows that precisely the same form of conduct may come to be motivated in a great variety of ways. The fact that such conduct may be primarily the expression of one instinct in particular becomes a matter of merely academic interest when it may, in point of fact, be brought about by any of the rest.

The force of these considerations becomes particularly apparent when we examine in greater detail the nature of the specific propensities upon which we have been tempted to suppose the hierarchical structure of society to be ultimately based. What precisely are the stimuli, and what precisely the responses, characteristic of the instincts of self-assertion and self-abasement?

Having in view the presumed importance of these instincts generally in the interpretation of the facts of social life, it is a matter of surprise to find how vaguely they have been defined.

In McDougall's own account<sup>1</sup>—the chief source of inspiration in this field—self-assertion amounts to little more than the impulse to display oneself in the presence of spectators 'to whom one feels oneself for any reason or in any way superior.' Submission or self-abasement is conversely the impulse commonly evoked by the presence of spectators to whom we feel ourselves inferior. And the impulse of this instinct "expresses itself in slinking crestfallen behaviour, a general diminution of muscular tone, slow restricted movements, a hanging down of the head, and sidelong glances. . . . All

<sup>1</sup> *Social Psychology*, ch. 3.

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these features express submissiveness and are calculated to avoid attracting attention or to mollify the spectator." This is a meagre and unpromising basis on which to build an ordered hierarchical society.

In attempting to refine upon this account Professor Campbell Garnett<sup>1</sup> has very rightly distinguished leadership from mere self-display. The instinct of leadership, in his view, embraces three tendencies—to surpass others, to exert our will over others, and to exert our will over things. The stimulus is merely the presence of opportunity, the chief condition of which is the possession of the requisite ability. Submission is merely the complementary of this—the impulse to submit oneself to leadership, guidance, and control; and the stimulus to submission is merely the presence of a leader. What this would seem to amount to is simply that each of us in some measure feels disposed from time to time to exercise control over other people, and that in general we exercise this propensity as opportunities arise. Conversely, when a lead is given we feel disposed to follow, and in the absence of any reason to the contrary we accept guidance and control. Some qualifying statement must be added to make it plain that not everyone takes every opportunity to exercise domination, and that not everyone follows everyone else's lead. But with the necessary addendum we should no doubt attain to some further psychological platitudes worthy of recognition. It may be willingly granted that platitudes of this kind are by no means lacking in importance; but they hardly serve to elucidate in any detailed way the more immediate factors relevant to the explanation of specific forms of hierarchical organization.

## II

A more empirical procedure might lead us to observe the growth of social structure in a simple and typical group. We

<sup>1</sup> *The Mind in Action*, ch. 5.

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might select for observation an assemblage of individuals combining for the promotion of some common cause. But the case would illustrate only the forces which make for hierarchical organization in the special association. It would fail to reveal important conditions which operate in the life of a community. A labour colony or one of the freer types of concentration camp might be more instructive, but here the conditions are unnatural. Since the family is the unit of communal organization we might consider a group of settlers bringing their wives and children with them and beginning a new life on some virgin soil. In this case, however, we should exclude the slow-moving forces of custom and tradition—forces on which, in older civilizations, some of the most distinctive features of hierarchical organization so obviously depend.

The difficulty serves to underline an elementary truth. To understand the structure of any group we must study that group itself and not another group of an entirely different kind. But even the briefest excursion into comparative social morphology would lead to the recognition of two further elementary truths. First, since some form of hierarchical organization appears in such diverse groups, the essential conditions of this type of social structure must be of an extremely fundamental kind. Secondly, inasmuch as hierarchical order assumes different forms in different groups, the specific character of this order must in part depend upon differentiating features in these groups.

Whenever we can observe the birth of a society, or whenever we find an assembly of individuals in a common predicament, what must first of all impress us is not the manifestation of a set of clearly defined and sharply differentiated instincts but the immense variety of possible human interactions. These actions are either co-operative or anti-operative in effect—according as the participants try to promote each other's ends or engage in mutual frustration. These results do not arise from any corresponding pair of primary

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tendencies: they may be produced by any propensity whatever.

So far as antagonistic action predominates over co-operation there is failure to form a group. The assembly subdivides into conflicting parts, the limiting case of which is the Hobbesian 'state of nature' in which the hand of each is raised against the rest. To produce a unified group there must be some predominance of the co-operative relations. Primary social interactions will not at first involve an ordered hierarchy nor the relatively permanent relations which the notion of leadership implies. Who may chance to lead and who to follow will depend upon the special nature of the immediate task in hand, and upon the distribution of relevant abilities. Some men are more versatile than others and, in consequence, will be more frequently to the fore. As ventures multiply, habits of leadership and habits of submission will be formed. A leader becomes the object of persistent 'attitudes,' confidence, affection, and respect, and will himself acquire the correlative attitude which loyalties beget. Those who share a common attitude to a common leader develop distinctive attitudes with regard to one another. In this wise occurs the differentiation of primitive social relations into vertical and horizontal ties. Leaders themselves will interact with one another and, so long as the balance is maintained in favour of co-operation, the process will be repeated. Leaders of leaders will arise, and we have the beginnings of a natural hierarchy.

At this point it will be convenient to define with more precision the nature of these 'attitudes' and 'ties,' which are here distinguished from reactive tendencies, from simple emotional dispositions, and from primary instincts. They differ from each of these in their origin, their nature and effects.

Their origin lies in the particular concrete experiences of the primary social interactions. Such interactions are characterized not by the evocation of some one specific

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emotion, reactive tendency, or instinct, but by an organized response of the personality as a whole. Effective co-operation consists in 'throwing one self,' i.e. one's whole self, into the task in hand. This entails a complex affective relation specifically directed to a fellow-man. Now in respect of the effects upon an individual of any such experience four importantly different possibilities require to be envisaged. In the first place, the experience may occur and pass, leaving no persistent change. The incident is dismissed, passing over the experient 'like water off a duck's back.' This is a rare and doubtful case. Complete nonchalance, like perfect elasticity, is an ideal limit rather than a phenomenon actually exhibited in nature. Secondly, the effect of an experience in relation to a specific object may be to establish a *generalized* disposition to respond in the same manner to any object which resembles the original excitant in any important way. In this way a dog once scratched by a cat acquires a generalized antipathy to the whole feline breed. A third case of importance is the formation of a restrictive or specialized disposition. The affective attitude is not extended to other objects, but is confined to the original excitant identified and recognized as such on subsequent occasions. It is not, however, incompatible with further attachments of the same kind. Lastly, there is the very important case in which the attitude is not merely attached to its original excitant, but is accompanied by a definite inhibition or withdrawal of this attitude from other objects, however similar in kind. There is the formation of an inhibitory 'fixation'—using this psycho-analytic expression in a slightly generalized sense and in a manner which implies no departure from normality.

The four cases are most clearly exhibited in respect of sex-attraction and the connected conjugal relations. The first, in which the emotion appears to be devoid of dispositional effects, is the case of the philanderer. It is also, presumably, the basis of promiscuity. The second is the case of those who are susceptible not so much to individuals as such but to

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individuals of a certain type. It is the case of the gentlemen who are said to prefer blondes. Polygamy would seem to require dispositions of the third type, whilst the monogamy of modern western civilization rests, a little precariously perhaps, upon the successful formation of inhibitory fixations.

One might be tempted to suppose that these four cases are peculiar to sexual and conjugal relations, but clear examples can be found in respect of other social ties. We find the genial soul who, forming no permanent attachments, experiences primitive comradeship with all and sundry; we find, too, the man of lasting friendships free from inhibitory fixations, and the individual who derives the completest satisfaction of his social needs in a single attachment. So, too, in the loyalties accorded to a leader. There are men who will follow anyone who cares to take the lead, those who are susceptible to leaders of a certain type, those who submit themselves to the guidance of specific individuals but are not incapable of divided loyalties, and those in whom attachment to one leader inhibits attachment to another.

Stability in the structure of society and continuity in social policy depends upon some measure of inhibitory fixation of allegiance. A mere instinct to follow all who take every opportunity to lead could but result in chaos. A society so founded would display as an abiding and prevailing characteristic all the proverbial fickleness of a crowd.

In consequence, then, of social interactions, dispositional attitudes are formed, primarily dispositions of the specific and restricted type. The completion of an act of co-operation leaves as its permanent effects a dispositional attitude expressed in consciousness by a sentiment or feeling of friendliness and in behaviour by a heightened susceptibility to repeat the co-operative act. But it would be a profound error to suppose that this exhausts the description of the dispositional effects. If A acquires a distinctive attitude to B, the whole of A's behaviour in respect of B undergoes systematic modifica-

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tion. In elucidation, let us suppose that some competent psychologist, prior to the encounter of A with B, had made an exhaustive study of both. The antecedent nature of each would presumably be described in terms of reactive tendencies, emotive and instinctive predispositions and so forth, according to the type of descriptive concepts our psychologist thought fitting to employ. How precisely, after the encounter, would the picture be changed?

The answer is, surely, that the change does not consist in some modification of a selected set of reactive, emotive, or instinctive tendencies. A's total responsive character in respect of B, and B's total responsive character in respect of A, are now other than what they were before. In the case of each, his reactive, emotive, and instinctive tendencies, and whatever else is relevant to his behaviour towards the other, have undergone *systematic* and *interrelated* modifications. A in contact with a neutral B—any complete stranger—would exhibit such and such tendencies; he would be angered, frightened, disgusted, amused, pleasantly or unpleasantly impressed in various ways and degrees, according to the manner in which B might happen to behave. He would have, so to speak, a certain antecedent coefficient of sociability, in virtue of which he would be willing to co-operate in some measure with B; he would have a certain antecedent liability to be suggestible by B, to be imitative of and sympathetic with B. Now, if in consequence of the encounter A acquires a friendly attitude to B, *all* of this is changed. He is hereafter less readily angered, frightened, or disgusted by B, more readily pleased with and impressed by B. His coefficient of sociability in respect of B is heightened. He is more suggestible, more imitative, more sympathetic so far as B is concerned. If the acquired attitude is one of hostility, the signs of the formula are changed. He is more readily angered, frightened, or disgusted by B. Suggestion, sympathy and imitation are replaced by contra-suggestion, contra-sympathy and contra-imitation, and his coefficient of

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sociability in respect of B is lowered. The formula differs too—although all the principal types of constituent remain—according as the encounter introduces leadership, discipleship, or some co-ordinate relation between A and B.

An attitude therefore cannot be defined simply in terms of either reactive, emotive, or instinctive dispositions. It comprehends all of these so far as they are implicated in specific relation to some particular individual. Analysis of a man's behaviour in terms of his attitudes cuts straight across all conventional divisions. An attitude is a general *schema* of behaviour co-extensive with the personality as a whole.<sup>1</sup> There is thus a very literal significance in the statement that a man exhibits a different personality in relation to his wife, his business partner, his subordinates, and his friends, to everyone, in fact, to whom he is related by a distinctive attitude.

Attitudes, like the specific types of interaction from which they are derived, may be either of the co-operative or of the anti-operative kind. A certain 'friendliness' is characteristic of the co-operative attitudes, implying not so much a tendency to any specific form of behaviour as a general willingness to adjust one's actions to the needs of the friend. The existence of a co-operative attitude towards an individual constitutes a 'social tie.' In addition to the obvious horizontal and vertical relations, we are compelled to recognize many others characterized by various forms and degrees of obliquity, such, for example, as the ties that unite man and wife, or the plumber and his mate. These ties collectively

<sup>1</sup> In the present connexion we are primarily concerned with attitudes restricted to specific individuals. In a more comprehensive account it would be necessary to refer to attitudes derived from generalized dispositions and to attitudes to things. It would accordingly be possible in terms of the present analysis to attach a technically precise and not unimportant significance to such common statements as that "Liberalism is not a system of doctrine but an attitude of mind." Restricted attitudes, moreover, unless accompanied by inhibitory fixations, constitute a crystallized core of a generalized attitude in such a manner that when, for example, an individual acquires a loyalty to his immediate superior a generalized attitude is accorded to the co-ordinate members of that superior's rank.

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constitute the warp and the woof of hierarchical organization.<sup>1</sup>

### III

In the foregoing section the first steps have been taken to account for hierarchical organization without invoking any special instincts of leadership and submission. The essential social ties are seen to emerge as a natural consequence of diverse interactions, no matter what the motivating forces of these interactions are. For the development of this thesis we should need, if space allowed, to consider these interactions in detail. So many things depend on the particularities of the case that purely general descriptions do not suffice. We should need to record, for example, how in some primitive community A and B went fishing, how A acted as leader on the journey, whilst B assumed the initiative in the matter of actually catching the fish; how the success of this venture fostered ties of friendship between the two participants; but how, in spite of this, a dispute arose between them later concerning the boundaries of their properties; how the dispute was settled by the mediation of C; and how C, by reason of his general good sense and experience of such matters, came often to be consulted on issues of this kind, and acquired in consequence a distinctive rôle and status in this society.

It would be tedious to specify these details, but only some such empirical method would fairly establish the general principles which, in default of this procedure, will here be simply assumed. Co-operative endeavour issues from the pursuit of common ends. Leadership and its converse arise from individual differences in experience and ability and in

<sup>1</sup> The analysis of a 'tie' here suggested has obvious relations to the Shand-McDougall conception of a 'sentiment.' It differs in being independent of any assumption concerning primary emotions or primary instincts. It differs more importantly in the implication of interdependence between *all* the various elements into which the personality as a whole is resolved. It might also perhaps be restated in the language of the Gestalt Psychology; it is preferable, however, that, for sociological purposes, the concept be kept as free as possible from entanglements with the doctrines of any special school of psychological thought.

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willingness to accept responsibility relative to the attainment of these ends. Hierarchical organization may in consequence develop in virtue of any common purpose whatsoever combined with diversity in relevant capacity. The general formula for successful co-operation might therefore be stated shortly as: *Community of ends with diversity of talents*. When, in the fishing expedition, for example, A assumes the leadership *en route*, his rôle is determined, not so much by the will to dominate as by the fact that he happens to know the way; and when B takes charge of the fishing operations this is sufficiently explained by his superior skill.

Recognition of the diversity in the springs of leadership has one important consequence which does not follow from the theory which would explain the facts by reference to a pair of primary instincts—the fact, namely, that leadership will assume a variety of forms in correspondence with the variety of its roots. And this we find to be the case. There are obvious and important differences in the characteristic ties involved in different types of hierarchical organization. Distinctive attitudes, based on different experiences, differences in character, and differences in ends, unite the private and the officer, the layman and the priest, the servant and his employer, the citizen and his parliamentary representative, the disciple and the leader in sartorial fashion. We venerate our saints and respect our aldermen, and many shades of admiration may be distinguished in our attitudes towards our intellectual leaders, our social betters, and our movie stars.

Leaders are clearly of many kinds. Some relevant distinctions have been drawn by Shakespeare, and some others by Professor Bartlett. Classifications may be based upon differences in the conditions through which authority is gained, upon differences in the mental types to which leaders belong, upon the varied specialized social functions which they serve. But not the least important are the distinctions which arise from the initiative of those who naïvely are supposed merely to follow. Those who have leadership thrust upon them

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suffer responsibility in virtue of all the limitations to the power of individual self-direction. There is accordingly a type of leadership appropriate to every psychical function. In some, the need is for leadership in action; in others, it is for guidance in opinion; in others, again, it arises from an incapacity for independent feeling. The 'man of action' supplies the required direction for those in whom exuberance of energy exceeds the organization of the channels of expression. But the man of action himself so frequently relies upon some less conspicuous colleague to supply the 'brains.' Movements in public opinion are commonly due to a subtler type of leadership exercised by quiet literary men—recluses some of them—through the medium of the pen. The artist, the poet, the critic, and the actor perform an essential social function in the control and guidance of the affective life. Simple human nature is nothing if not emotional, but untutored feelings are crude and vacillating and strangely inadequate to the situations which call for æsthetic response. The ways of feeling which perhaps more than anything else characterize an age—compare, for example, the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, or pre- and post-War England—are due to a type of leadership which operates in the main upon the affective life.

Specific types of leadership are characteristic of different kinds of groups. Social groups are sometimes divided into the purposive and non-purposive kinds. But if the view here adopted be correct—that co-operation depends upon the existence of common ends—all groups are of the purposive type. The important distinction is that between the sort of group which depends for its existence upon a relatively narrow and specific common interest—the special association—and that which rests upon an immense variety of common interests or ends—the community, and other subsidiary groups of the communal type. The community and the association are not co-ordinate species. The former is the more fundamental, and associations arise out of the community by a process of differentiation. The basis of cohesion in the community lies

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in the ' general purposes of life '—the need for food, clothing, shelter, and so forth, and all the secondary needs derivative from these. In the primitive community there may be some approximation to a general leadership on the basis of a corresponding general competence for the direction of endeavour for the attainment of these varied ends. With increasing complexity in life there is differentiation of social function and consequent differentiation of social structure, entailing differentiation in social ties and different types of leaders. The Church, the Medical Profession, the Army, industrial and commercial organizations, each exhibit a distinctive type of hierarchical structure based on correspondingly distinctive social ties.

In contrast with these relatively specialized structures we find important sub-groupings which retain most of the general communal characteristics of the whole to which they belong. Of the latter, the most obvious example is the regional group. But of greater interest in the present connexion are the stratifications of the community by the emergence of differences in social class. A social class, as Mr. Marshall has shown in his penetrating analysis,<sup>1</sup> shares with the community the characteristic of being an organization based on the general purposes of life. Different classes are distinguished, not in the number or in the general character of their needs, but in the special manner in which their needs are satisfied. Men are alike in their need for food, clothing, shelter, a means of livelihood, and recreational pursuits; they tend to differ from class to class in the kind of food they eat, in the style of clothes they wear, in the architectural and decorative features of their houses, in their occupations and in their hobbies. A difference in class is thus in part a difference in general cultural level. To the production of the general cultural picture of a community, and hence of its various levels, many influences contribute. A class is a stratification of society composed of approximately equivalent ranks of the major

<sup>1</sup> This journal, vol. xxvi, No. 1, January 1934.

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hierarchies of which the community is composed. The nature of the whole, and of the consequent class distinctions, will vary with the nature and with the relative predominance of the constituent special hierarchical organizations.

Differences in innate endowment would lead in any society to the formation of a hierarchy exhibiting distinctions of cultural level, since differences in interest and taste are apt to follow from, or to be associated with, differences in ability. But if inborn qualities of mind determine status in some hierarchy, status in a hierarchy in turn determines further qualities of mind. A man's position in a hierarchy imposes a certain mode of life, certain experiences, and certain associations. And some of the characteristics so engendered will tend to cancel the influence of endowment. They do so in virtue of all the factors which exercise a restrictive influence upon vertical mobility; and prominent among those factors is the fact of social class itself.

In general, it is only in so far as specific hierarchical structures overlap different social classes that free mobility is possible, since ascent through the ranks of one of the major hierarchies constitutes the normal avenue of transition from a lower to a higher social class. Conversely, class distinctions tend to become the more rigid as hierarchies or sub-hierarchies are bounded by the limits of class. There are, so to speak, blind-alley hierarchies, such as those of skilled labour and some of the semi-professional vocations, in which even the highest rank stands well below the apex of the social pyramid. There are also specific hierarchies the very entrance to which is barred to all below a certain social level. Special interest in consequence attaches to those sociological changes which affect mobility within the major specialized hierarchies and to those which enhance the general status of one of these hierarchies in relation to the community as a whole. Particularly important are educational reforms, since in general many separate hierarchies are thereby affected. So, too, the circumstances which give priority to military, ecclesiastical,

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or any other of the pervasive hierarchies will exhibit characteristic effects at every social level.

In the general analysis here suggested, brief and schematic though it be, enough perhaps has been said to indicate the manner in which the concept of a hierarchical society might prove to be significant for the interpretation of social processes. In place of the simpler conception of social structure as based upon two or three specific instincts, we have adopted the more complicated picture of a system of interpenetrating hierarchies founded upon an immense variety of 'social ties.' These ties have been conceived as specific types of dispositional effect produced by specific modes of co-operation, and each involves a systematic variation of all the 'dynamic' elements of personality so far as these are concerned in particular social relations. In virtue of their common tendency to facilitate further co-operation they might be described as differentiations of 'primitive comradeship.' The general formula of co-operation—'community of interests and diversity of talents'—provides a further specification of the general principle that differences, no less than similarities, are required to secure the cohesion of a group. It indicates, moreover, the two basic directions in which differentiation occurs—laterally in virtue of divergence of interest, vertically in respect primarily of divergence in relevant ability.

It is doubtful whether, at any point in man's development or history, the individual can properly be described as a member of an undifferentiated herd, but the farther he departs from this and the more he comes to 'occupy a position' in a network of interlacing hierarchies, the less adequate merely general psychological principles become for the interpretation of his behaviour and of his inner mental life. At the levels with which the sociologist is in the main concerned with him, all his reactions are the expression of the attitudes and ties which this position entails. The 'struggle for existence' has become the 'pursuit of a career'—a more or less regularized progression through hierarchical ranks, the

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successive steps of which are conditioned by seniority, experience, or the satisfaction of semi-automatic tests. Pugnacity has become litigation, or the operation of 'machinery of conciliation.' The instinct of escape is no longer evoked by the perils of the jungle, but by threatened loss of status. The basic social processes of suggestion, sympathy, and imitation have ceased to be random waves of herd contagion spreading in concentric rings from an arbitrary centre of initiation; they now descend downwards and outwards, through defined hierarchical channels. So far as the individual is subject to suggestion from his leaders and co-ordinates in a specified institution, so far he has become contra-suggestible to corresponding ranks in a rival group. Imitation likewise has become a canalized social function. The fashion of wearing a moustache may descend through the ranks of one hierarchy whilst simultaneously and with a total absence of interference the fashion of removing it is descending through another.

It is only in virtue of the formation of attitudes, persistent dispositions to respond in certain ways, that the notion of 'structure' comes to be applicable to minds, and derivatively to groups, the character and the integrity of which rest on social ties. A coronation cannot in itself make a man a king, nor the taking of a vote in itself enact a law; since these are events which pass and cease to be. All that persists is the disposition in individual minds which these events create or modify. It is, therefore, upon the nature of these dispositions that the stability of a hierarchical organization in the last resort depends. It is, also in virtue of these dispositional ties, and in virtue of their bi-polarity, that the wills of individuals come to be focused into a single act, and, conversely, the responsibility for this act effectively diffused.

## THE PLACE OF ENTERTAINMENT IN SOCIAL LIFE

By DENYS W. HARDING

THE question of the satisfaction gained from work in a modern western community as compared with others has in recent years gained more and more attention, and with it has come to the fore the complementary topic of entertainment in relation to work and the rest of life. E. Sapir, for example, in 'Culture, Genuine and Spurious' (*American Journal of Sociology*, XXIX), suggests that in a modern community, where work stands out 'as a desert patch of merely economic effort in the whole of life,' most workers must compensate themselves by non-utilitarian activities (those aimed at what he calls 'indirect' ends), or by vicarious participation in such activities: 'The captain of industry is one of the comparatively small class of individuals that has inherited, in vastly complicated form, something of the feeling of control over direct ends that belongs by cultural right to primitive man; the ballet dancer has saved and intensified for himself the feeling of spontaneous participation and creativeness in the world of indirect ends that also belongs by cultural right to primitive man. Each has saved part of the wreckage of a submerged culture for himself.' For the average worker nowadays entertainment looms large in 'the world of indirect ends.' The Lynds, similarly, in *Middletown*, their study of urban life in the Middle West, lay stress on a supposed diminution in the satisfactions obtainable from work itself and a greatly increasing need for the worker to provide himself with other satisfactions, prominent among them being those got from entertainment.

Less disciplined writers have been still more eager to relate modern forms of entertainment to the supposed effects of

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industrial work and other contemporary social phenomena. Up to the present these correlations have been attempted on the strength of rather uncertain assumptions about the psychological mechanisms involved in entertainment, and it is this less exciting, but still necessary, preliminary topic which it is the purpose of this paper to discuss.

The most widely current view of the matter is that which sees entertainment as providing the audience with vicarious experience. Not only has this idea been accepted by technical writers, such as Sapir, but, partly owing to the absorption of imperfectly understood psycho-analytic views, it has been given an extensive popular welcome, especially from those who deplore the badness of contemporary entertainment and attribute it to the nature of industrial and commercial work. The theory of vicarious satisfaction in entertainment is undoubtedly conducive to a discouraged view of the situation. It is disturbing to think that one colossal industry has grown up in order to supply workers in this roundabout way with what the other industries have deprived them of. It is understandable that educationists especially should regard entertainment as their enemy, and that organizations which aim at improving the leisure pursuits of workers rarely, if ever, concern themselves with their entertainment. Objections to entertainment as such and the conviction that most people have too much of it rest chiefly on the beliefs, first, that it is 'passive,' and, second, that it works by the mechanism of vicarious satisfaction. Its 'passivity' can hardly be upheld as a serious objection: the enjoyment of art and literature is passive in the same way, the truth being, of course, that all such pursuits demand responsiveness in some degree and that this may amount to extremely intense activity. The idea of vicarious satisfaction, with its suggestion of daydream and wish-fulfilment by fantasy, provides a more serious objection. Before it is accepted, however, there are a number of doubts to be examined and an alternative view of the psychological nature of entertainment to be considered.

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The theory of identification, and consequent vicarious satisfaction, is used to account both for the relationship between spectators and performers in what may be called 'display' entertainment (for instance, football matches, acrobatic performances, speedway racing), and for that between the spectators and the characters in 'representational' entertainment, such as plays or novels, where imaginary situations are presented.

On the whole, it seems more plausible when applied to the former kind of entertainment, and this may be examined first. It is probable, of course, that we can enjoy watching only those feats which it would give us some satisfaction to perform ourselves if we could, or at least those in which we can understand the satisfaction as a development of similar slighter ones that we do know. Though we may not have actually attempted ballet-dancing or acrobatic feats, we have almost certainly found satisfaction in some form of physical dexterity and grace, and we now find it satisfying to see these potential human capacities developed to a high degree. When displays such as dance marathons or long-time pole-sitting fail to 'catch on,' it is presumably because they are too remote from anything that the public could imagine getting gratification from themselves.

The theory of vicarious satisfaction as it is generally understood would suppose that there occurs in the spectator an unconscious identification of himself with the performer, so that the impulses he supposes the performer to be satisfying are also satisfied in him. If it means anything worth saying, the theory must mean that the spectator is in an abnormal social relationship with the performer and fails to treat him as someone other than himself. It is clear how completely unconscious the identification must be if you reflect that during a performance you may consciously realize how far beyond you these feats are and yet feel no diminution in your pleasure; so, too, cripples are said to enjoy displays of dancing.

The suggestion that in any given case identification has

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occurred can hardly be disproved (nor, I think, would it be easy to prove), but if it is claimed that this always occurs, or is the normal mechanism of entertainment, then it is difficult to see any precise limit to what may be explained in the same way. The public's admiration for aviators and explorers is obviously amenable to this explanation; so too, we may suppose, is the popular respect for astronomers; and the less usual, but still frequent, interest of lay people in mathematicians can hardly be excluded. Is one to suppose that our impulses to manipulate figures logically receive vicarious satisfaction from our contemplation of the mathematician? It would seem possible to argue on these lines that any admiring or respectful attention to other people, indeed any interest in them that is not accounted for by their obvious practical meaning to us (as enemies, for example, or helpers, or sexual objects), comes about because we are identified with them and gain vicarious satisfaction from their activities.

But this is a far from satisfactory conclusion. Even in analytic terminology the 'object love' relation, which is distinguished from identification, seems to satisfy subtler social needs than these self-regarding ones. Moreover, and of greater importance for ordinary usage, the whole point of employing the idea of identification to explain entertainment is that this relationship should be something unusual; if it now turns out to be no more than a name for the process which underlies all sentiment formation, its explanatory value in the special case, and the implications it was supposed to have, disappear. We are brought back to the fact that we possess an ill-defined sentiment of liking for other human beings as such, and that therefore (whatever the psychological mechanism of the sentiment may be) we enjoy seeing them do things that we should enjoy doing ourselves. We are even able to enter imaginatively into the supposed feelings of animals and may find ourselves thrilled by horse- and dog-racing. If the appreciation of entertainment involves being in a daydream, so does practically the whole of our social life.

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A further objection to the theory of vicarious satisfaction appears when one considers the attitude of spectators to competing performers, as, for instance, in football or tennis. In the first place you may have a feeling of proprietorship in a team or a player, in which case your satisfaction if your side wins will obviously not be vicarious: it will be as direct as it is when your candidate wins an election. You have adopted the definite relationship of possession, and feel extended self-responsibility instead of a vague sense of friendly interest in another human being. Even when this sense of proprietorship exists there may not be, and at other times certainly is not, any simple identification with one side or the other. In watching tennis you get your enjoyment from the display of human effort and skill on both sides, and though you may want one man to win, you constantly feel admiration for the other, and may even enjoy his performance more than that of your own man. To have to suppose that you are identified with both sides simultaneously or in rapid alternation complicates and still further weakens the theory of vicarious satisfaction.

It seems a tenable alternative view, therefore, that our social relationship with an entertainer is not essentially different from our relationships with other people in many ordinary life situations; in watching a policeman control traffic, for instance, or a motorist trying to start up a cold engine. Usually, of course, the activity we watch in entertainment is of a more exciting kind. The peculiarity of the entertainment situation and of those like it is that we remain in the position of spectators without becoming 'practically' involved. Such situations, however, in spite of our seeming passivity, are not without importance, since the interest we feel and the attitude we take up are inevitably contributing in some degree to the organization of our emotional life. To wipe out, supposing it possible, the effects of all the occasions on which a man was merely a spectator would be profoundly to alter his whole character and cultural status.

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A kind of entertainment which is of far greater practical importance than that considered so far is represented by novels, plays, and films. It is to these that the related ideas of vicarious satisfaction, identification, and wish-fulfilment by fantasy are most frequently applied. Jung expresses the prevailing view when he says: 'The cinema . . ., like the detective story, makes it possible to experience without danger all the excitement, passion, and desirousness which must be repressed in a humanitarian ordering of life.' (*Modern Man in Search of a Soul*.) But the notion is extraordinarily widespread. In serious research it has been used by the Lynds in *Middletown*, and by Q. D. Leavis in *Fiction and the Reading Public*, where she takes 'Living at the Novelist's Expense' as one of her leading themes and interprets much novel reading as the indulgence of wish-fulfilment fantasies. Earnest popular writers use the same idea: 'With the lovely heroine, the laundry worker dons silk underwear . . . an evening cloak with soft furry collar. During the day she has stood with damp feet in badly fitting high-heeled shoes which took two weeks' savings. But now her well-shaped leg is enclosed in stockings of finest silk, and shod by shoes from the Rue de la Paix. For an hour!' (Contributor to *The Adelphi*, March 1934.) And to the smart writer the notion is equally acceptable: 'George was glad to earn two pounds a week by tedious toil, and for relaxation . . . indulge in remote concupiscence with unknowing film-stars.' (Rebecca West in *Nash's Pall Mall Magazine*, February 1934.)

One peculiarity of the use of this idea is that it is only applied to what these writers evidently regard as inferior entertainment, although clearly the same psychological process must be involved in any presentation of an imaginary situation which the author and reader (or spectator) find welcome. It would seem that if one condemns *Her Desert Lover* as wish-fulfilment one must equally condemn, say, the imagined religious revival in D. H. Lawrence's *Plumed Serpent*, or, in E. M. Forster's *Passage to India*, the conversation

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between the white woman and the Indian in the temple. In each case these books provide the appreciative reader with a character whom he can sympathize with and whose affairs sometimes turn out happily. It is impossible to condemn only the more popular fiction on the grounds of the psychological mechanism it is supposed to employ; if the idea of vicarious satisfaction is to apply to any entertainment of this kind it is difficult to see how we can avoid applying it to all fiction and drama.

Again, however, one can find an alternative view to that which sees a continuity of function and psychological process between the daydream and entertainment of this sort. It is possible to regard entertainment as being essentially a matter of sociable communication, and continuous in function and process not with daydreaming but with gossip. Both gossip and this kind of entertainment consist in the description or representation of a supposedly interesting situation in a supposedly appropriate light, with the expectation that the audience will share the interest and sympathize with the attitude adopted. As a generalized description, this will apply to novels, plays, films, a large part of the newspapers, songs, jokes, and some painting. It obviously applies to gossip too; talk of illness and death, weddings and adultery, clever deals and good luck, aims at presenting interesting situations in an appropriate light. The entertainer, of course, presents his situation more vividly and keeps his own comment more implicit—not to say insidious—but the psychological situation is not essentially different.

There is, however, a sense in which the represented situation is 'lived through' without the occurrence of identification and vicarious experience. Although we are not identified with any one of the characters in a play or novel we are nevertheless held in an imagined social relationship with them all, as if we were invisible and impotent spectators amongst them. In this way we may experience intense feeling, rather as we might experience it, for example, on behalf of a friend

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whose wife was dangerously ill; in such circumstances we follow the progress of the illness with an anxiety of our own, an anxiety that envelops our friend as well as his wife. Our emotions are quite other than the emotions of our friend himself, 'sympathetically induced' in us; and certainly our experience is not vicarious. Similarly, at a film: *our* emotions as we watch the hero tearing along in his car to the rescue of the heroine are not those that *he* may be supposed to have—of hope, sickening fear, a struggle to keep cool, and attentive exertion which may obliterate every other feeling; but those of the spectator—suspense, anxiety about the total situation, and potential pity or rejoicing over the hero as well as the heroine. This, of course, is to take the crudest kind of play where there is a clearly labelled hero, the kind to which the theory of vicarious satisfaction should apply more plausibly than to any other, but for which it nevertheless seems unsatisfactory. To say, on the other hand, that we experience imaginatively certain defined social relationships with the characters, remains true even of our response to the subtlest plays or novels.

If tentatively we accept the view that gossip and representational entertainment fulfil the same functions, it remains to ask what these functions are. No very certain answer can be given, and the suggestions which can be made must, like most of this paper indeed, be taken as preliminary speculations.

In the first place it seems significant that gossip and entertainment are usually selective enough and definite enough in their presentation of events for us to make a comparatively ordered emotional response with considerable assurance that it is appropriate. We are thus relieved of the muddle of 'real life' and the fluctuations and inhibitions of feeling that actual events produce. Primarily, however, it seems that both gossip and entertainment have the function of reminding us of the more interesting possibilities of living, and of convincing us that important things do happen to the sort of people

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in whom we have a social interest. (There are, of course, other functions of gossip than this, but this alone would probably serve to keep it alive as a social activity.) Finally, it is in the nature of entertainment and gossip that they represent events in such a way that we remain in the position of a spectator, not involved except in so far as our interest in human activity as such involves us. In spite of our emotional response we cannot be called upon to take part. Moreover, the sentiment which binds us to the *personae* of fiction and gossip is the generalized and comparatively weak one that we feel for strangers, even interesting strangers. This is probably why, within limits, we can bear the entertainer's description of painful and calamitous events, as well as finding them 'interesting' in the strict sense. This explanation of the fact that they are bearable is at least preferable to any which relies upon the 'unreality' of the events represented.

Since the unreality of the situations shown in entertainment is a possible source of misunderstanding, it is worth examining. There is no doubt that the events of a film, say, are unreal in the sense that they never happened, and the spectator knows it. They do, however, draw attention to certain real possibilities of human life and feeling, and if it is right to regard entertainment as functionally continuous with gossip the unreality of the situations represented is likely to be of small importance compared with the reality of the communication they make possible. That the events shown in a play need not be fictitious is indicated by the success of biographical plays. And the truth of gossip is probably not its most vital attribute. The transition from true gossip to admitted fiction is perhaps to be found in the 'touched-up' funny story and, for less mobile generations, in the traveller's tale; in these the convention of fiction is not openly accepted but is tolerated in practice for the sake of the interesting possibilities it opens up. In entertainment also it seems that the events represented are taken as a convention of com-

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munication, and it is for this reason that we experience what Coleridge called the 'willing suspension of disbelief' in responding to any fiction in entertainment. All that we believe in are the interesting human possibilities which the fiction allows the entertainer to bring up and comment on. It seems clear that in watching a film or a play we respond to what we recognize more or less consciously to be a social presentation of events and not to events themselves.

This is perhaps not true for a very naïve audience faced with a realistic play, the kind of audience which is said to have hissed the villain of the Victorian melodrama. For such an audience the play is evidently on the way to becoming a form of 'display' entertainment, a series of real events watched in the same way as people may watch a street accident when it is certain that they themselves will not be called on to do anything. But even with an audience of this kind there almost always remains some recognition of the secondary social function of the events presented; entertainment has ceased entirely for the drunken sailor or the little girl who fails to recognize this and wants to go on the stage and help.

For the convenience of discussion two kinds of entertainment—that in which some feat is performed and that in which a situation is represented—have been dealt with separately. It need hardly be said that in fact the two kinds are frequently combined. In watching ballet, for instance, we may get pleasure both from the display of physical skill and grace and from the satisfying treatment of a theme. Moreover, there will be enjoyment of the non-representational aspects of the music, *décor*, and choreography. This blending of satisfactions is typical of much entertainment. Entertainment, too, may blend with recreation (in which the social relationship of the spectator does not occur), as in horse and dog backing, where some thrill from the imaginatively apprehended situation of the animals may blend with the

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recreational excitement of the gambling and of our sense of proprietorship in one of the competitors. These topics bring up questions which cannot be examined in this paper. Nor is there space to consider the controversial question of the relation of entertainment to art. None of these wider inquiries can be profitably pursued until the general nature of entertainment is better understood.

What is really in question when the subject is discussed seriously is the status of entertainment among social activities. The most widespread, if not prevailing, view is that which sees it as 'escape,' usually adopting the theory that the escape occurs by means of the fantasy process. It must be admitted, of course, that daydreaming may well be *stimulated* by both entertainment and gossip: gossip about love affairs, plays, and novels of adventure and romance, obscene jokes, newspaper reports of heroism at fires or suicides' last letters, these may all stimulate daydreaming. It remains to be discovered how far they actually do. In any case the process of being entertained, even if it stimulates, is not itself the same as daydreaming. The difference in the psychological nature of the two processes is vital for the social status of entertainment.

Once the daydream theory is abandoned there cannot be much significance in saying that entertainment is an 'escape.' It is only an escape in the way in which any interesting activity may be an escape from some other activity. So, too, one cannot get far by saying merely that in being entertained one 'forgets oneself,' for this again is true of engaging in any interesting pursuit. One may, of course, assert that people are wasting time on entertainment when they could better be doing something else, but only in the same way as one might say that they were spending too long at business or politics or astronomical physics. There is no warrant for regarding entertainment in itself as being equivalent to a soporific drug of which a small dose may be tolerated but any extensive use condemned out of hand. What can be con-

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demned is bad entertainment, if one can be sure that it is bad. But entertainment as such is a normal human activity which, like gossip or music or politics, may be given varying prominence, and may attain different degrees of excellence, in different cultures.

One prominent feature of entertainment ought perhaps to be looked upon as, in a sense, escape, although it is not usually treated as such. This is laughter. Psychological accounts of laughter up to the present have not given much direct help towards an understanding of its place in entertainment. They have usually been concerned with the content of the ludicrous or with the mechanism of laughter as an expression of emotion. More important for entertainment is the attitude to the situation which we imply by laughing at it. Here the most helpful writer on the subject is the most recent, Ralph Piddington, who, in *The Psychology of Laughter*, does stress the fact that at its simplest 'laughter expresses, maintains, and communicates a mood in which there is no need felt for the organism to make any further adjustment to its environment beyond the one at the moment existing.' Later Piddington seems rather to confuse the issue, but his general line of argument provides support for the view that in laughing at an event we adopt towards it, momentarily at least, an attitude of complete irresponsibility. It is an abnegation of our usual state of mind in which we constantly approve or disapprove of our situation, and so exert ourselves, if only in the slightest degree, to maintain it or alter it.

Being amused certainly seems different from most emotional states in that it does not indicate the need for any further effort, and in fact inhibits it: most people are familiar with the evaporation of their anger if the object of it looks sufficiently ludicrous; most people have been rendered helpless and unable to aid a friend who was in some ludicrous difficulty. Even when laughter is based—if it ever is—on a feeling of superiority at somebody else's incompetence, there is still, I think, no real feeling of aggressiveness while you

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are actually laughing. You are content to accept things as they are. And it seems to be of the essence of comedy entertainment to present situations which have some relevance to human concerns but are nevertheless made completely care-free. In much entertainment of this kind there seems to be the simple need to laugh at something or anything. The object appears to be solely to escape from cares. In other comedy there is a more thorough justification of the laughter attitude as being the most appropriate reaction to a situation of serious interest, though this 'serious comedy' would usually be regarded as art rather than as entertainment. The distinction between 'escape comedy' and 'serious comedy' needs considering much more carefully before it can be accepted as valid, but superficially it seems possible to say that in 'serious comedy' the laughter is the result of seriously examining an important situation, whereas in 'escape comedy' almost any situation and any treatment of it will be good enough so long as they provoke laughter, which is itself the one aim. For the study of entertainment as an aspect of culture, the important question is not what, in general, tends to be ludicrous, but what changes occur, as people develop emotionally, in the situations which they find funny.

Similarly for entertainment as a whole: a statement of its general function can only be regarded as a preliminary step. Far more important is an analysis of actual entertainment, especially of the representational kind; an analysis of the interests, sentiments, and attitudes that it reflects. Nor does it only reflect them; it confirms or modifies them. Gossip and entertainment, in fact, are probably the principal instruments of a highly important part of popular education, for between speaker and hearer, and between entertainer and audience, there goes on continuously a reciprocal sanctioning of each other's interests, sentiments, and attitudes. An appreciative audience at a film is implicitly agreeing with the producer's implicit suggestion that his hero is the sort of man who is worth feeling intense concern for, that to a man like

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this such and such things may happen, and that when they do it is highly exciting in certain specific ways. To suppose that the position of the spectator is a passive one would be strangely to limit the meaning of the term 'activity.' Entertainment of this—the most important—kind expects of the audience a heightened social responsiveness; it may be regarded as an intensification of those social activities which, without immediate and obvious practical results, extend and define our sympathies, and so control our subtler emotional life and our more intimate social relationships.

## AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF PRIVATE FAMILIES IN ENGLAND AND WALES

By GRACE G. LEYBOURNE

IT is of great importance to housing authorities that an estimate should be available of the number of separate dwellings that will be required in the future. Attempts made to meet this need are described and discussed by Sir E. D. Simon in his book *The Anti-Slum Campaign*. These include one by Mr. C. J. Hill, of the Economist Intelligence Department. Some of the earliest of these calculations have already shown themselves to be unreliable, and hence, considering the importance of the question, another forecast would seem to be justified.

In making this estimate, the census figures for 1921 and 1931 are used and, for future years, the estimates published in the *Sociological Review* in April of this year. No account is taken of families of only one person, since these do not as a rule occupy separate houses. It is further assumed that only adult persons between twenty and seventy-four years of age last birthday will require separate dwellings. It is true that some persons of seventy-five and over do, in fact, dwell alone, or together as husbands and wives; but, on the other hand, some elderly persons who are under seventy-five, especially widows and widowers, live with their married sons or daughters. This section of the population, aged twenty to seventy-four, at each selected date is separated into married, single, and widowed or divorced. For each group an estimate is then made of its contribution to the total of private families. Various considerations are taken into account in deciding the relative sizes of these different contributions. Thus, it is assumed that the number of families formed by the

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married group will be rather less than half its total, because some of these people will be separated and some will live in their parents' homes. There will also be a small but not insignificant fraction of all the single persons who will not live with their parents or friends but will form separate families. Finally, not all the widowed or divorced group will be expected to require separate houses, because some of these also will live with relatives.

In estimating, for future years, the distribution of families of various sizes, the same proportions are assumed as were recorded in the 1931 census. These showed a considerable change as compared with the 1921 census, and it is, of course, possible that the tendency towards an increasing proportion of smaller families and a decreasing proportion of larger families will continue.

The results of these calculations, which are given in the tables set forth below (page 409), show that the number of families is likely to continue to increase until near the middle of the century and that it will then begin to decrease. It is seen, moreover—and this is of considerable importance—that the decrease in number of families does not begin until ten years later than the population itself begins to decline. Thus, from about 1938 to about 1948, an estimated decline in the population is accompanied by further increases in the prospective number of families requiring separate dwellings. New houses will therefore be required for ten years after the population itself has ceased to grow. Hence it is an error to base housing requirements on the growth or decline of the total population; the relevant population for this purpose is rather that between the ages of twenty and seventy-five.

The new census figures show that, in 1931, there were 144,000 more private families of two or more persons than structurally separate dwellings (of which there were 9,400,000). A rough estimate of future housing requirements may therefore be obtained by adding to this existing deficiency in housing accommodation the estimated increases in

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THE NUMBERS OF SINGLE, MARRIED, AND WIDOWED OR DIVORCED  
(AGED 20 TO 74) IN THE POPULATION, IN THOUSANDS.

Year.	Single.	Married.	Widowed or Divorced.	Total.
1921 . .	6,505	14,847	1,883	23,235
1931 . .	7,310	16,825	2,041	26,176
1936 . .	7,649	17,527	2,175	27,351
1941 . .	7,829	17,941	2,226	27,996
1946 . .	7,968	18,258	2,265	28,491
1951 . .	7,922	18,155	2,252	28,329
1956 . .	7,783	17,834	2,212	27,829

PRIVATE FAMILIES OF MORE THAN ONE PERSON ( $F_{2+}$ ) COMPARED WITH  
THE TOTAL POPULATION, IN THOUSANDS.

Year.	$F_{2+}$ .	Increase or Decrease (-).	Total Population.	Increase or Decrease (-).
1921 . .	8,212		37,887	
1931 . .	9,544	1,332	39,988	2,101
1936 . .	9,823	279	40,214	226
1941 . .	10,055	232	39,870	-344
1946 . .	10,233	178	38,934	-936
1951 . .	10,174	-59	37,749	-1,185
1956 . .	9,995	-179	36,331	-1,418

Thousands.

Shortage of houses in 1931	.	.	.	144
Estimated increase in separate families 1931-1936	.	.	.	279
" " " " 1936-1941	.	.	.	232
" " " " 1941-1946	.	.	.	178
				<u>833</u>

THE DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES OF VARIOUS SIZES IN THOUSANDS.

Year.	$F_{2+}$ .	$F_1$ .	$F_{2+2}$ .	$F_{4+4}$ .	$F_{7+}$ .
1921 . .	8,212	527	3,371	3,657	1,184
1931 . .	9,544	689	4,700	3,999	845
1936 . .	9,823		4,837	4,115	871
1941 . .	10,055		4,951	4,212	892
1946 . .	10,233		5,039	4,287	907
1951 . .	10,174		5,010	4,262	902
1956 . .	9,995		4,922	4,187	886

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private families of more than one person. This would show that 655,000 houses will be required by 1941 and 833,000 by 1946. It is noticed, moreover, that the demands are greatest in the years immediately ahead of us. Over five-year periods from 1931, the forecast gives increases of 279,000, 232,000, and 178,000; thereafter there are decreases. This, of course, does not take into account the need for additional houses for other reasons than the growth of population; for instance, many houses at present inhabited are really unfit for habitation, and many are deplorably overcrowded.

### METHOD ADOPTED IN MAKING THE ESTIMATE

The starting-point is an examination of the proportions recorded in the census returns for 1921 and 1931 of single, married, and widowed or divorced persons in the population of age from twenty to seventy-four years last birthday. For each of the three groups the percentages obtained in the two years differ only in the first place of decimals, and the mean of the two percentages is taken as that to be applied to future populations.  $P_s$ ,  $P_m$ , and  $P_{w,d}$ , the single, married, and widowed or divorced populations of twenty to seventy-four, are then obtained by applying the appropriate percentage factors to the populations in 1936, 1941, 1946, 1951, and 1956 as previously estimated and recorded in the *Sociological Review* (April 1934).

We now turn to consider the relation of the number of private families to the single, married, and widowed or divorced populations. These are assumed to be connected by an equation of the form :

$$F_{2+} = \frac{1}{2}P_m (1 - x) + P_s y + P_{w,d} (1 - z),$$

where  $F_{2+}$  denotes families of two or more persons and  $x, y, z$ , are relatively small positive fractions. In forming this equation, we are guided by the considerations that we may expect the married group to give a total of families rather less than  $\frac{1}{2}P_m$ , the single group to give a total which is a small fraction of  $P_s$ , and the widowed or divorced group to give a contribution somewhat less than  $P_{w,d}$  itself. The known figures for 1921 and 1931, families and population, are substituted, giving two equations each involving  $x, y$ , and  $z$ . There is an infinite number of values of the three unknowns which will satisfy these two equations. Indeed, we cannot assume that  $x, y, z$  remain constant from census to census. The relation is to be regarded as purely empirical and the method adopted to obtain suitable small positive values for the unknown factors is the simplest and

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most direct which makes full use of the available data for 1921 and 1931 by a process of averaging. To go back before 1921 would introduce material which cannot under present conditions be regarded as appropriate. By putting  $y$  and  $z$  equal to zero in each equation, two values are found for  $x$  and their mean is taken. Similarly, a mean value is obtained for  $z$  by putting  $x$  and  $y$  equal to zero in each equation. The substitution of these mean values of  $x$  and  $z$  in each equation then gives a pair of values for  $y$ , of which again the average is taken. Since  $P_m$ ,  $P_s$ , and  $P_{m,s}$  have already been estimated for future years, the relation is now ready for use to determine the corresponding estimates of  $F_{s+}$ .

The 1931 distribution of families of different sizes is finally employed to estimate also the distribution of  $F_{s+}$  families in future years.

It is a pleasure here to acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. D. Caradog Jones, of the Social Science Department of Liverpool University, by whom I have been guided in making this and my previous estimate of the Future Population of Great Britain.

*Note.*—By an oversight, a mistake was left in the table at the foot of page 132 in the *Sociological Review* for April 1934. 40.9 was given as the percentage of younger workers in England and Wales in 1931 instead of the correct figure 46.9. The following sentence should therefore have emphasised that there is likely, by 1951, to be a relative increase in the *older* section of the working class.

## BOOK REVIEWS

### LEAGUE OF NATIONS SIXTH INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

CONFERENCE: A Record of a Second Study Conference on the State and Economic Life held in London from May 29 to June 2, 1933. Edited and published by the *International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation*; Paris, 1934. 15s.

This volume falls to be noticed in the *SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW* not so much on account of its substance as of its method. Reports of conferences on theoretical subjects are seldom satisfactory to the reader, however well edited. Symposia do not lend themselves to reproduction; or, when they do, they are best commemorated by a single hand. In this case we are dealing not with a single symposium, but with the second phase of a discussion which was itself broken up into two gatherings or "commissions." Thus there is an inevitable lack of unity in the volume. For the outside reader its interest, therefore, will be rather in the many suggestive points to be encountered here and there in the record of the discussion than in the attempt at a coherent treatment of the theme itself.

From the sociological point of view, however, it is the idea and organization of the Conference, as illustrated by this volume, which are chiefly worth notice. The history of the Conference is a curious example of the evolution of a project. In the year 1926 a proposal was laid before the League of Nations Committee of Intellectual Co-operation for the establishment of an "international university" for the training of a new and improved type of diplomat. It emanated from an eminent *savant* whose field, however, happened not to be that of the social sciences. Unwilling to reject the project as unconsidered and impracticable (for what, if anything, when you come to think of it, does "international university" mean in these post-mediæval days?), the Committee evaded it by placing on record the desirability of closer co-ordination between existing institutions concerned with the study of international relations. This led to contact being established between the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, a French committee presided over by the Rector of the University of Paris, and the Hochschule für Politik in Berlin (since destroyed), and then to the holding of a first Conference for the Scientific Study of International Relations (as it was then called) in Berlin in 1928. Thereafter conferences were held annually, membership being granted to institutions or groups of institutions in different countries, now fourteen in number, and to a small group of international institutions, of the type of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Honolulu.

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The early meetings of what is now called the *Permanent International Studies Conference* were confined to the technique of collaboration—and, of course, to “becoming acquainted.” At the fourth meeting, held in Copenhagen in 1931, it was decided to embark on real “international intellectual co-operation,” that is, on a discussion, not of machinery but of ideas. The theme selected was “Government and Business,” or, as it appeared in final form, “The State and Economic Life.” The first Study Conference on this subject was held in Milan in 1932; the second was the London meeting recorded in this volume.

How far has it proved possible to discuss this problem—a typical “problem of international interest”—frankly, fairly, and fruitfully in a gathering of this kind? That is the question which the sociologist will naturally put to a participant. The answer is that the discussion has been enjoyable, enlightening, stimulating, but that its primary object has not yet, after these two experiments, been achieved. That object was to promote real team-work between scholars drawn from institutions in various countries—team-work comparable to that which exists, or can easily be organized, inside a single country. Anyone who glances through this volume will very soon bear this judgment out for himself.

To what has this comparative failure been due?

One drawback, of which the reader will find evidence for himself, is that not all the members of the Conference were, intellectually speaking, free beings. In spite of all that rules and statutes and atmosphere could do, those attending from one or two countries felt bound, or perhaps it would be fairer to say, spoke as though they felt bound, to be “governmental.”

This, however, is perhaps only a temporary phase which will pass away with the vogue of dictatorship. More serious is the fact, which leaps to the eye from these papers, that the members of the Conference had no common intellectual basis on which to build their corporate effort. They were divided by their specialisms. They were divided by their countries, because, in differing intellectual traditions, the same specialism may be cultivated in wholly different ways: it is unnecessary to illustrate this from the fields of international law, economics, sociology, and political science. They were divided, above all, by their philosophies, or, in some cases, by their lack of a philosophy—in other words, by their *values*.

Is team-work possible between scholars without common values? Or, on the other hand, does not the assumption of the need for common values behind intellectual effort undermine the intellectual freedom which alone can make the effort worth while?

To ask these questions is to open up a large subject which cannot be discussed at the end of a review. But they are questions which naturally

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suggest themselves to anyone who has been associated with an endeavour, such as that represented in this volume, to promote the cause of unity—of the old *Universitas* of knowledge—without detriment to the still greater cause of Truth.

ALFRED ZIMMERN.

**DER ÜBERGANG VOM FEUDALEN ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN WELTBILD.** Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie der Manufakturperiode. By Franz Borkenau. Schriften des Instituts für Sozialforschung, edited by Max Horkheimer. Paris, Alcan, 1934. 100 francs.

The object of this learned and elaborate work is to trace the sociological origins of the new science and philosophy that were developed in the seventeenth century by thinkers such as Descartes, Pascal, Gassendi, and Hobbes. Herr Borkenau fully accepts the Marxian ideal of a materialistic interpretation of history. He seeks to establish not merely an analogy between the economic and the ideological development of modern culture, but an absolute determination of the whole intellectual culture by the two inseparable factors of the forces of production and the social relationships founded on the production process. At first sight it may seem an unpromising task to attempt to deduce the philosophy of Descartes or the religious principles of Pascal from the economic conditions of their age. Nevertheless, Herr Borkenau has avoided the naïveté and crudity that have so often characterized the historical explanations of Marxian materialism. He does not attempt to explain history away by the parrot-like repetition of Marxian formulas, nor does he dismiss philosophy, as Marx himself was inclined to do, in the same way as the rationalists treated Christian theology, that is to say, as mere metaphysical castles in the air. He recognizes the immense importance of philosophy as the creator of those fundamental categories of thought which are the basis of the modern science of nature. This breadth and profundity of treatment, however, necessarily involve a thorough-going historic relativism which seems to me to have more in common with the philosophies of Mach and Bogdanov than with genuine or orthodox Marxism. The true Marxian is by no means anxious to question the foundations of our knowledge of nature. He accepts natural science in that naïve and rationalistic spirit which is itself in Herr Borkenau's view an index of bourgeois mentality. Modern science is, so to speak, bourgeois science; it is one of the ideological products of capitalist culture. No doubt it has actually much increased our knowledge of nature, "but it would be an illusion to conclude from this, that our modern categories of thought are the only ones adapted for natural experience. We cannot tell what aspects of

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possible experience are closed to us by this system, owing to the fact that we live within it."

Thus the object of Herr Borkenau's study is to trace the development of the new mathematical and mechanical view of nature out of the social conflicts of the time. It is by no means an easy task, for the new categories of thought were not created by the new economic classes, as the Marxian theory might lead one to expect. They belong far more to the old centres of Catholic culture—to Italy and most of all to France. Herr Borkenau accounts for this fact in the following way: "In the lands where Calvinism became the ruling religion—in Holland, England, and the United States—there was no independent and continuous development of philosophy, because in those countries capitalism had ceased to be a problem. But there were three other countries which had developed an agrarian capitalism without developing the rationalized capitalistic process of production as the common form of life. Here the fundamental problems of capitalistic existence became the object of persistent and systematic reflection, though under very different national conditions. This reflection culminated in France in Descartes and the rationalist school that followed him; in Italy in Vico, and in Germany in Kant and in Idealism."

And as it was not the typical capitalist countries that developed the new forms of thought, so too it was not the typical capitalist class. The "ideological leadership" in the formation of the new categories of thought fell not to the bourgeoisie, but to an intermediate class, which Herr Borkenau describes by the English word "gentry." He deals at great length with the social composition of the religious and intellectual movements of the time and concludes that in almost every case—whether it be the Jansenists, the movement of Catholic revival, or Cartesianism and science—the leaders were drawn from this class, which took the decisive rôle in the culture of the time.

It is impossible within the limits of this review to follow Herr Borkenau in his subtle and elaborate analysis of the social movements of the time and their corresponding ideological manifestations. His conclusions deserve the attention of every student who is interested in the problems of modern European culture. Nevertheless, I must admit that I am not altogether convinced either of the soundness of his conclusions or of the fruitfulness of his method of interpretation. There is always a danger in such theories of forcing the evidence to harmonize with the author's hypothesis. It is, for example, perfectly true that the gentry took the lead both in the French Catholic revival, associated with Cardinal Berulle and the Oratorians, and in the Jansenist movement. But then they were the most active element in the culture of the age, and their influence is to be

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seen in *every* movement, for example, among the Jesuits who represent for Herr Borkenau primarily the society of the court and the great nobles. Instead of explaining these religious movements purely from the structure of society and the economic trend of the age, it seems to me more justifiable to take them on their face value as religious movements and as the product of religious forces. Given the existence of the Catholic Church and its institutions, given the Protestant attack and the need for a Catholic defence, given the Catholic revival in Spain and Italy and the influence of the new Spanish and Italian religious orders in France at the beginning of the seventeenth century, then a religious revival of French Catholicism in the seventeenth century is the natural corollary, and we need no new economic and sociological factor to explain its existence. No doubt every religious and intellectual movement is conditioned by sociological and economic forces, but the relation is not the direct relation of effect to cause. The attempt to make it such leads Herr Borkenau, in spite of all his learning, unconsciously to falsify his theological data, as, for example, in his treatment of Molinism, which he seriously misinterprets, because he approaches it from a social and ethical angle, without giving sufficient attention to its actual theological presuppositions.

Finally, I must register my dissent from Herr Borkenau's judgment on the seventeenth century, a judgment which may be partially responsible for some of his conclusions. In his eyes the seventeenth century is "one of the darkest periods of human history," an age which has kept all the religious terrors of the Middle Ages while losing the optimism of mediæval scholasticism and the fraternity of mediæval corporate life. It is easy to understand that the age of the Thirty Years War must appear less attractive to a German than does the seventeenth century to ourselves. No Frenchman can regard the Grand Siècle, the age of Racine, Molière, and Mme de Sévigné, as no better than "an earthly hell"; and we who know the seventeenth century as the age of Shakespeare and Sir Thomas Browne and the Caroline poets, may find it difficult to subscribe to Herr Borkenau's judgment of "the fearful age in which those iron-hard thinkers arose" who laid the intellectual foundations of the capitalist world. For us the iron age is rather the age of the Industrial Revolution, the age of Malthus and Ricardo, and the age of Marx and Engels themselves.

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.

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### RECENT SOCIAL SURVEYS

**THE SOCIAL SURVEY OF MERSEYSIDE.** Directed by D. Caradog Jones. *University Press of Liverpool and Hodder & Stoughton, 1934.* Three Vols. Vol. I, 15s.; Vol. II, 21s.; Vol. III, 25s.

**WORK AND WEALTH IN A MODERN PORT: An Economic Survey of Southampton.** By P. Ford. *Allen & Unwin, 1934.* 10s. 6d.

**BRYNMAWR: A Study of a Distressed Area.** By Hilda Jennings. *Allenson, 1934.* 10s. 6d.

The increased production of comprehensive local social surveys is an interesting development in post-war social study. These, like the earlier surveys, are an outcome of a growing awareness of aspects of the contemporary social and economic situation. The aspects, however, are somewhat different in the two cases. In the cases of Booth and of Rowntree, the problem to be studied was that of the poverty of the working classes in a country otherwise still materially prosperous. To-day the social surveyor has to throw light upon the condition of the working class in a period of relatively much greater depression. Rowntree, Dr. Mann, and Professor Bowley in his first "Five Towns Enquiry" all demonstrated that the major cause of pre-war poverty was lowness of wage-level; the finding of Professor Bowley's second "Five Towns Enquiry" (1925) and of subsequent investigators is (as we should expect) that the major cause of post-war poverty is not lowness of wage-level, but long-continued unemployment.

This in part explains a further distinction between the earlier surveys and the new, represented by the above works. Booth surveyed London and Rowntree York; but only as typical areas of industrial Britain. To-day, however, we find, to a greater or less extent, that attention is being paid to the peculiar characteristics, industrial, social, and so forth, of the locality and to the peculiar problems with which it is faced. A noteworthy example of this tendency was Dr. Mess's *Industrial Tyneside*; the same tendency is shown to some degree in the first two of the above studies, and particularly in the last. There are, of course, several explanations of this. Urban areas can only be called "typical" in a rough sense, and work proceeding on such an assumption is in a sense only preliminary. Secondly, the social survey has been influenced by the conceptions of Human Geography, especially that of "Natural Areas," which have reached it partly through the work of Geddes and partly through the related work in regional planning, with its social and cultural corollaries. In the third place, the problems to be dealt with are bound

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up more closely with the prosperity of industries, a topic whose local reference is expressed in the phrase "Depressed Areas."

Equally important to notice, however, is the acceptance and development by most modern social surveyors—and notably by the author of the *Merseyside Survey* and by Dr. Ford—of the technique built up by Booth, Rowntree, and Bowley. The use of the "Mass-Interview," or the "Direct" method of investigation of the conditions of a random sample of households; the use of some form of the "poverty datum-line"—that rather tantalizing conception—and the correlation of numerous aspects of social life—of measurements of the extent of poverty by means of the Poverty-Line with those of overcrowding, of family composition, and so on—combine to make the comprehensive local social survey a method of social investigation in its own right and one of much value.

Of the surveys dealt with here, that of Merseyside must, by reason of its comprehensiveness, be given first place. It comprises three large volumes, each designed to appeal to somewhat different interests; though all contain matter of great importance for the sociologist.

The first volume, after a short introductory account of the geographical character and the history of the locality, deals mainly with questions of housing and of poverty. According to the Registrar-General's standard, Merseyside saw some improvement in conditions of overcrowding between 1891 and 1901, a deterioration between 1901 and 1921, and an improvement again between 1921 and 1931. The changes, however, are not of great magnitude. The writers take just exception to the use of the Registrar-General's standard as anything more than an index, and on pp. 128-130 define a much more elaborate and realistic standard. This standard was described in a paper read to the Royal Statistical Society at an early stage of the investigation, and has since been used in several other investigations. According to it, 10.8 per cent. of families in the whole survey-area were found to be overcrowded. Next follows a discussion of income and poverty. A poverty datum-line, that is, the figure representing the cost, at the prices prevailing in the locality at the time of investigation, of the "minimum necessities of existence" for families of various sizes, is worked out, and compared with actual incomes of a random sample of families. It is found that in the week of investigation, 16 per cent. of families fall below the poverty-line, while 70 per cent. of families have incomes more than 50 per cent. above it. In Liverpool alone, the proportion in poverty in the week of investigation was 17.3 per cent., while on the assumption of full-time earnings, the proportion would have been 9.5 per cent. only, a demonstration of the part played by unemployment and under-employment in the genesis of poverty. With these figures may be compared the figures of the New

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London Survey compiled in the same year (1929-30) which were 9.8 per cent. (in the week of investigation) and 5.7 per cent. (assuming full-time earnings). This affords some indication of the comparative prosperity of London. The interesting fact is given that if Public Assistance is included in income, the proportion beneath the poverty-line sinks only from 16 to 14 per cent.

Among other matters in this volume which must at least be referred to are the study of the relation between poverty, overcrowding and "economic class" (that is, the classification of families according to numbers and condition of earners), and that of the ability to pay higher rent. The former incidentally throws further light upon the importance of unemployment as a cause of poverty. In the latter it was found that according to the proposed criterion, discussed on pp. 183-4, 56 per cent. of sampled families found to be overcrowded could probably afford to pay higher rent.

The second volume deals chiefly with the condition of industry and with employment. It is shown that the great bulk of industrial activity on Merseyside is dependent upon world conditions. The future prosperity of the region is therefore chiefly dependent upon world-conditions, although the importance of activities in a smaller measure so dependent is not to be underrated.

A discussion of the earnings of different classes includes the finding that the most prevalent wage for boys in "progressive" work was higher than that for blind-alley occupations: another interesting reversal of pre-war conditions.

Chapter IV contains a valuable investigation into Occupational Mobility, both "vertical" and between different industrial groups. It is found that the proportion of those who have moved down, in comparison with their fathers, on a clearly defined scale, is larger than that of those who have moved up. Those who have stayed in the same grade as their fathers comprise the largest group. If, on the other hand, each movement is weighted according to distance in grades travelled, the up and down movements almost exactly balance. Comparison with two similar studies in other areas "brings out the important point that the proportion remaining in large groups is greater than that remaining in small groups. Where nearly half the working-class are unskilled labourers, unskilled labourers' sons are far less likely to rise than in a town where only one-fifth belong to their grade" (p. 41). An investigation of mobility between industrial groups found greater mobility than in previous studies of certain smaller towns, and it is suggested that "comparatively small towns with local industries breed a certain industrial stability among all the population whether employed in the localised industry or not"

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(p. 45). Such sidelights on social structure constitute to the sociologist not the least important part of the work.

Most of the remainder of the volume is concerned with detailed discussion of the major industries of the region. It is impossible to notice these here, save to mention that they include a chapter on Distribution, at present perhaps one of the most interesting industries to the sociologist. The volume concludes with discussions of industrial location and of unemployment, whose importance, shown before, is reiterated. It is estimated that in mid-1932, out of a total occupied population on Merseyside of 578,000, at least 140,000 persons were unemployed.

Volume III is mainly concerned with Local Government and other local social agencies, and with a study of certain special groups, including what are known as "sub-normal types"—a somewhat inclusive category, containing, amongst others, mentally defectives, criminals, and deserted wives. In the first part, the complaint, familiar in other quarters, is made that the vastness of the organization of the Liverpool Corporation prevents the majority of councillors from getting a view of its activities as a whole. No single authority exists to represent what may be called "Merseyside opinion." There is a lack of co-operation—a trend towards increasing separation, in spite of the recognition among the well-informed of the need for increased co-operation.

The volume concludes with a discussion of differential fertility. It is found that, "In general, the worse the conditions, the larger on the average is the family. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that these different phenomena are interrelated" (p. 533). This leads to an interesting though not a novel hypothesis: that certain groups in which large numbers of births and deaths occur contain a foundation of families of a poor type in common. The characteristics of such a family are, that its head is of a low occupational grade, lacking in stability of employment, that it falls frequently below the poverty-line, and becomes dependent on public assistance, that it is overcrowded, has a high infantile mortality, and health below the average. "All the evidence seems to support the theory, to which reference was made at the beginning of Chapter 14, that in any large centre there exists a 'Social Problem Group,' the source from which the majority of criminals and paupers, unemployables and defectives of all kinds are recruited" (p. 546).

The above notes give little idea of the wealth of material contained in the three volumes of the *Merseyside Survey* and still less of the technical skill which has gone to making it. The work is at least the equal of the *New London Survey* and is indeed one of the finest pieces of empirical social study made in recent years. It is to be hoped that more surveys of such a quality will be undertaken.

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Dr. Ford's work is on a much smaller scale. With the time and money at his disposal this was inevitable. In general, however, the book is in its scale of the same high standard. Much of the technique and the conceptions are indeed common to both surveys; a valuable characteristic of the modern survey which has been remarked upon before.

The survey was "designed as a contribution to our knowledge of poverty, its incidence and causes . . . it goes behind the immediate facts . . . because this book is in part a plea for more general attention to these wider issues behind administrative policy, it may be regarded as an essay in the economy of cities" (p. 5).

The survey is to a large extent an investigation into the social effects of casual and fluctuating employment, and in this regard may be compared with the *West Ham Survey* by Howarth and Wilson made twenty-five years before.

A short historical excursus leads to the fact that Southampton is now transformed "from a town owning its docks and foreshore, and controlling its harbour, to a railway-owned port in which the main sources of wealth had passed into private and external control." At present the majority of the greater businesses are either non-local in origin or are non-locally controlled.

The chapter on population shows that population is increasing at a decreasing pace. The proportions of those of the industrially productive ages has increased, a fact so far making for a higher standard of living.

The upshot of these facts and of those of industries given in Chapter III is stated to be that the male population is dependent upon three occupations: the sea, ship-repairing, and dock-work, of which the first two are subject to wide fluctuations, while the third is being decasualized.

Chapter V is devoted to a study of income and poverty. These are treated by the double method of mass interview and direct investigation of a random sample, which were introduced respectively by Booth and by Bowley. Unfortunately, as Dr. Ford points out, the mass interview was carried out in 1928 and the other method of enquiry in 1931, the interval—which was solely due to lack of time and staff—rendering it difficult to compare the results of the two investigations.

Lack of space forbids an adequate review of the conclusions of this chapter. It was found that 12 per cent. of all families with dependent children, 14 per cent. of children and probably 14 per cent. of the population, were in income classes receiving less than 42s. per week. Twenty-one per cent. of working-class households were below the "poverty-line." In comparing these figures with those for London and Merseyside, it must be remembered that the latter were obtained a year or two earlier. An investigation of "Potential Poverty" showed that, if

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the effects of supplementary earners were subtracted both from the earnings and expenditure sides of the family budget—that is, if the principal earner had, out of his own earnings, to provide only for himself, his wife and dependent children—34 per cent. would be in “poverty.” The principal cause of poverty is again unemployment, two-thirds of those in poverty being below the line on account of it.

The volume concludes with special studies on the “Depressed Classes,” Housing and Crime.

The study of Brynmawr, a small mining town in South Wales, occupies a somewhat different category. In part it is a community self-study, of a kind more familiar in the United States than here; in part also it is intended to reinforce the aim of “bringing about the permeation of industrial relationships by a new spirit, and at the same time opening out avenues of employment which might gradually obviate the necessity for relief” (p. 209). It is, that is to say, much less of an empirical study than are the others.

The study was initiated by the Coalfields Distress Committee of the Society of Friends, and was carried on almost entirely by members of the town itself. The problem was, given the very probable inability of the recent iron and coal industries to support the town any longer, and given also that the disposition of the inhabitants does not favour emigration, what characteristics of the town or of its inhabitants can be looked to and developed for its future benefit, both material and spiritual?

The treatment is largely historical. The working of iron in the early nineteenth century and the importance of coal mining after the eighties have led to large immigration into the town, which continued till the depression of 1926. But it is the central theme of the book that the impress of the native population upon the immigrants and the influence of the common environment have led to the development of common traditions—to the existence in the town of a “community spirit” in the sense of the term which will be familiar to students of Quaker social thought. The development of this is traced in early industrial relationship of members of the town, and in the religious and cultural influences operating upon it. It is upon the development of this spirit of community with its consequent mental and social health that, according to the study, the future well-being of the town depends. In addition, some account is given of housing, of unemployment, and of public finance, and a chapter is devoted to the efforts to promote community industries and town improvement, which are descendents of the same movement which inspired the survey.

It is clear that the central thesis of the book is a debatable one. It is indeed admitted that class and other divisions are influential in the town

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(see, for example, p. 82). The community spirit is in fact as much a hope as something presently existing. One may in addition be permitted to think that the conception of community is hardly sufficiently defined, and that, in proportion as it is defined, the difficulties of applying it to any locality in modern England will become more and more apparent. However, the criticisms made above by no means detract from the value of community self-study. The work may in addition be recommended as affording valuable insight into the aims of one school of social theory and practice.

A. F. WELLS.

DIE GESCHLOSSENE WIRTSCHAFT. Soziologische Grundlegung des Autarkieproblems. By Bernhard Laum. *Tübingen*, 1933.

Herr Laum's book is worth noticing as an obviously sincere and earnest effort to give a solid basis to the discussion of Autarchy. The writing of the book was prompted, he tells us, by the discussion of the problem at the meeting of the "Verein für Sozialpolitik" in Dresden, in September 1932, which disclosed a "rare unity of view" against the idea and its present practice. Herr Laum therefore felt moved to provide a corrective, all the more so as "a gulf between science and life is characteristic of our time," "sane common sense being opposed to theoretical speculations" (p. 4). It is not only that economics has increasingly taken flight into what one may call stratospheric abstractions, but also that it claims a right to existence *per se*; and of such aberration *laissez-faire* economics and Marxian economics are equally guilty in the eyes of the "totalitarians." Othmar Spann's "Universalismus" in Austria and Gottl-Ottlilienfeld's "Allwirtschaftslehre" in Germany, for instance, seek to correct that distortion by putting economics in its place as part of a comprehensive social science—a sociology.

The present volume is written from that standpoint: it deals with its subject, the author claims, not by means of theoretical speculations, but of a concretely-empirical inquiry. And he indicates a second aspect as characteristic of his approach. Because the true social life fulfils itself most naturally and continuously in the mass of the people, this study ranges itself along the new interest in all that is "popular," primitive, close to the soil, where sentiment is stronger than reason and economic life "governed by instinct and emotion." With formal logic, therefore, though rather startlingly, Herr Laum devotes the core of his book to a study of those social groups where life still lingers in a natural state, and to an inquiry into the motives which cause those primitive groups to segregate themselves socially and economically.

The tendency towards segregation from the outer world is greater,

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he says, the more tense the inner ties of the group. There are, first, ties of blood and soil. The effect of unity of blood is obvious. To this is added in time the tie with the soil on which the group is settled ; and this often develops an additional link through common property in land, and a common division of labour. A second group of elements, binding internally and segregating externally, are religious beliefs, including totemism and magical taboos. In the more elaborate social groups, in States, the reasons which make for segregation are more complex. The State takes over from the primitive tribal groups, out of which it grew, a sense of responsibility for the welfare of the community which it embraces. This higher community also develops certain civic virtues : dislike of foreigners, dislike of traders, dislike of foreign luxuries. Moreover, as the State rests upon social justice, the unity of law and of social structure leads to the control of production and prices, and to a search for economic balance through the control of exports and imports. Finally, the modern State also develops a national consciousness, with a trend towards independence and separate organization for defence.

These are the reasons which make for Autarchy. The means for achieving it are general or natural (physical), and special or politico-economical. Though isolation is never complete, the effects of isolation, actual and ideal, are very definite. The more general effects are both physical and psychological. Isolation strengthens both the marrow and the morals of a people. "The longer the segregation of a people lasts, the more grows the measure of accumulated strength" (p. 325). And, generally, segregation develops a fine spiritual balance, and self-control in an exceptional degree. In a more special way, segregation preserves purity of morals, while commerce tends to destroy fine customs and traits. Hence the high points of culture are found in history side by side with Autarchy ; and that is why island cultures are higher than continental cultures, and inland regions reach a higher level of culture than maritime regions.

The book makes no attempt to apply the argument—which we have tried to outline faithfully—to existing conditions and problems, but ends fittingly enough with a profession of faith in anti-intellectualism. "Reason divides, but sentiment unites" (p. 481) ; therefore "vitality" must be strengthened at the expense of "rationalism." The puzzling thing is to know why in this case the author has taken so much pains and space to find reasons for unreason. The argument about the respective merits of maritime and continental civilizations reads queerly from a Western European, whose whole civilization has come from the Eastern border of the Mediterranean, from Greece, and from Rome ;

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and when in the East, Japan, whom the author deeply admires, has copied and learned wholesale from China. The historical illustrations which he adduces in support of his ideal are stranger still. To him the perfect type of an Autarchic State was the Roman Empire. "The limits of the Empire were so far-flung, that all the products of the settled world were at the disposal of its citizens. The Empire was economically altogether independent of the outside world" (p. 411). If a State, to be self-sufficient, has to span half the globe, until it holds within its limits all the resources of civilized life (in the sense of Fichte's "natural frontiers," which were to be obtained even by war), what meaning is there left in Autarchy? And what happens to all the biological and psychological virtues which Herr Laum had found to arise from the segregation of racial communities? His modern and obviously envied example is Japan. Herr Laum produces it as proving his argument that the longer the segregation the greater the accumulated strength, which, however, is not an end in itself, but only results, when the time is ripe, in a "more elemental assertion of the urge to expansion" (p. 324). If successful segregation only leads to a more "effective spreading out over a wider space," the result is suicidal for the long list of virtues and qualities which Herr Laum has discovered in isolated communities; as it also is destructive of the elaborate argument which he has painstakingly reared upon his romantic premises.

The author himself admits sorrowfully that his ideal is not easy of fulfilment. "The facts of reality impede the progress of the idea." But that does not mean that the idea is wrong, but rather that life is become distorted (p. 480). He notes with hope the break-away from debilitating intellectualism and the return towards the elemental and the instinctive; but he made a fatal mistake in attempting a scientific justification of that beatific state of irrationality. The truth of such beliefs cannot be proved by Faculties of the Social Sciences, which really become superfluous; it is revealed rather in the public speeches and broadcasts of the Nazi leaders, whom Herr Laum quotes with enthusiasm in the concluding pages of his book.

We have reviewed this volume at some length, keeping closely to the writer's facts and arguments, only because it illustrates so strikingly the present drift of social writings in Germany. Those of us who have formerly derived help from them must hope that the future will again link up with a past full of fine scholarly achievement; and in the meantime we can only offer up sorrowfully the traditional prayer for those at sea.

D. MITRANY.

## THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

AN AFRICAN PEOPLE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By  
L. P. Mair. *Routledge*, 1934. 12s. 6d.

Three preliminary quotations on the function of anthropology will serve to introduce Dr. Mair's viewpoint and to indicate what she set out to do in her remarkable study of the Baganda: remarkable, because she has achieved in nine months results for which in the ordinary way nine years would not be too long an estimate; because, too, she has proved that, despite the advance in anthropological technique which the last few years have witnessed, Roscoe's book on the Baganda is still as indispensable as when it was written a quarter of a century ago. That she had Roscoe's book to help her was undoubtedly an enormous asset, both positive and negative, and she pays generous tribute to her predecessor. In one sense, therefore, her book may be treated as a necessary appendix to Roscoe's, because it both brings the study up to date and also—again thanks to modern technique—contrives to make the Baganda far more vital than Roscoe, for all the profundity of his knowledge, ever succeeded in doing. The Baganda live in these pages as human beings with emotions and sentiments in which we can share, and are no longer anthropological automata or problems to be dissected in a laboratory. That is an achievement of merit in itself, even if it is a *parergon*: for Dr. Mair's main problem was not to restate Roscoe's case, but to show what changes have occurred since he wrote. Her study is one of culture contact, and she has proved with exceptional skill that anthropology has a practical value in approaching and studying the relations and situations that arise between two sharply contrasted cultures.

But I must let her state her position for herself. "The conflict," she writes, "which confronts colonial governments is not one to be solved by methods of trial and error, by mere firmness or even by mere goodwill. It calls for scientific study as a basis for rational planning—social engineering as it has been called. . . . Through the understanding of native society that anthropology brings, it is possible to see where European innovations have subjected it to the severest strain, where their effect has been positively harmful, where the indigenous culture provides that foundation on which alone can be securely built the new institutions which modern circumstances require."

And again, in discussing those aspects of primitive culture which are repugnant to modern civilization, she adds this very necessary warning: "Yet, to the anthropologist who sees culture as an organic whole, even those institutions which seem in terms of human suffering most cruel will be found to have some place in the maintenance of the society, such that their uncomprehending destruction must carry with it the loss of essential

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elements in the social structure; while the condemnation of others will prove often to be due to mere failure to recognize their positive value." Every administrator, from his own experience, could add chapter and verse to this wholesome text, but I shall leave Dr. Mair to show us its immediate application: for she adds pertinently that "it is by the provision of reliable material for answering such questions that the use of anthropology can transform colonial administration from an art to a science."

That is the crux of the whole matter. We have been content to muddle along, without even the justification that it is for art's sake. We have landed ourselves from one impasse into another, with the best of intentions provoking where we might have conciliated. It is time that science now took a hand in the business, and it is for Dr. Mair to prove that the science of anthropology is capable of the large claims which it puts forward. Let me say here and now that in my opinion she has succeeded admirably in delineating the changes which have taken place under British influence among the Baganda, and in indicating as accurately as her evidence permits the causes which have directed the evolution of culture along the specific lines observed by her. A series of studies of this sort would go far to ease the inevitable conflict between African and other cultures, and would enable us to formulate a more rational policy than we have done in the past. It is impossible to generalize—and Dr. Mair does not try to do so—on the basis of a single study: but having had some experience of the problems of the Baganda, I am convinced that had a book of this sort been available twenty years ago, many of the difficulties of an adolescent culture might have been avoided, and there is no saying how much more permanently effective would have been our attempts to "civilize." From the point of view of the native culture and its contribution to future development there can be no dispute as to the necessity for studies such as this: but it is as yet insufficiently realized that we stand to gain as much as the African by a scientific approach to the problems of contact. Altruistic motives apart, for in any case they are suspect, it must pay us economically to assist in the evolution of a new society, competent to produce and to take our products, with as little disorganization as possible; and that end can only be achieved by a clear perception of the indigenous economy and of the processes by which it can take advantage of our stimulus and accommodate itself to new requirements.

This is what Dr. Mair sets out to do, and we are left with the twofold impression that on the one hand the Baganda are still, for all their progress, in the early adolescent stage (did not one, otherwise quite intelligent, ask whether the project of Closer Union was not designed to

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provide the Prince of Wales with a private kingdom ?), and on the other are making a very fine attempt to grapple with the new problems of adaptation. We come away with the conviction that their old culture is remarkably flexible, eager to assimilate, liberal, quick to size up situations, and yet conscious of its own virtue, proud of its traditions, selective rather than blindly receptive.

The change that we find, therefore, is not nearly so revolutionary as we might have expected, except in the few instances where it has been arbitrarily imposed from without. But thanks to the fact that in Uganda the policy of Indirect Rule, the utilization, that is, of existing institutions, has always been recognized and put into practice by the administration, these cases are remarkably few, and for the most part evolution has taken place by a process of social seepage, which gave a fairly wide scope for rejection or acceptance by the Baganda and enabled them to adjust the mechanism of their institutions without too severe a wrench. Though the process was inevitably hastened during the period of post-war development, to which Uganda was subjected equally with the neighbouring states, the social structure appears to have stood the strain remarkably well and to have exhibited far fewer symptoms of malaise than one finds in communities which have been completely divorced from their own institutions.

These conclusions are amply justified by the material which Dr. Mair offers us in her book, and we may take from her, though she does not state it in these terms, a couple of examples which will illustrate what we have been saying. Dr. Mair suggests that the serious dislocation to be seen in the sphere of sexual ethics is due to the fact that "the standards laid down by Christian teaching are not taken for granted by the natives as they are by those who still adhere to them in Europe; rather they are regarded as a set of arbitrary rules to be disobeyed when that can be done with impunity." This divergence between belief and the acceptance of a new code is best exemplified in the new outlook on marriage. It is here, perhaps, that we find the greatest conflict between practice and principle, between the new and the old, and the institution with its attendant circumstances now stands as a warning signal against arbitrary interference with an established custom, the ramifications of which are but dimly perceived. The question of monogamy hardly arises, as polygamy is dying out with the passing of the economic system to which it was appropriate and the change in the former sex-ratio. But the obsolescence of certain ceremonies, formerly considered imperative, but now discounted as unwholesome pagan rites incompatible with our concept of marriage, has resulted in a grave loosening of moral restraints. The ceremonial inquest into a bride's virginity, though sometimes still

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held, is by many considered to be futile, as she would almost certainly not be a virgin. Some old women still think that Christian weddings are shocking, because at them a woman is seen going to her husband, which would normally only have happened when a girl already pregnant was sent to her husband. Many of the practices thus associated with the Christian rite of marriage in some way conflict with the established views of what is right and wrong. "Compared with the bride-price," writes Dr. Mair, "the ceremony in church is of secondary significance, even to the most religious": but unfortunately the bride-price is no longer what it was. Instead of being the public evidence of a contract and a security for the permanence of marriage, it has become a source of profit to the parents, largely because under Christianity marriage has become a theoretically indissoluble contract, and the bride-price which was "the pledge of its maintenance, has become almost an inducement to those who should be interested in its stability to encourage its repudiation." Many of the old kinship observances associated with marriage have broken down as a result of the changed attitude towards the bride-price (though it is to be remarked that several tabus would have broken down in any case, as it is impossible to avoid people whom one should not meet, when travelling by motor-bus), and this has all helped to throw sexual ethics in the melting-pot, now that the old ethics have been discredited and the new ones have not been accepted. It is symptomatic, perhaps, that both bride and bridegroom nowadays hire their wedding costumes from Goanese traders!

We may turn in conclusion to a final example of adjustment which though it started with an apparently arbitrary innovation has exhibited the innate stability and adaptability of the Baganda. One of the effects of the Uganda Agreement concluded in 1900 was to introduce the conception of land as a private possession at the complete disposal of an individual owner. This, together with the concurrent adoption of a monetary economy, encouraged the idea of land as a source of profit, while the assignment of land to heirs dissociated rights over land from the governmental functions to which it had hitherto been related. Now this process might have proved disastrous in many communities, and it will be remembered that the Basoga definitely rejected the proposal of individual holdings as not being consonant with their culture. But among the Baganda the concept of land was already in process of change, and their political organization was such that a territorial grouping was becoming more important than the blood-tie. The innovation was not therefore so revolutionary as it appeared at first sight, and it has fitted in with the individualistic concept of society which the new economic activities of the Baganda have developed. There have been, and still are, mal-

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adjustments of course, but the innovation was one which, despite many obvious demerits, the Baganda have appreciated, and it has given them an opportunity to display their characteristic gift of compromise, with results which on the whole may be called happy. They have accepted new obligations defined by law, the substitution of rent for service, and a number of new situations which their grandfathers would never have considered possible; and they have made the new situation an integral part of their own culture. The change has had far-reaching social effects in conferring individual rather than communal status, though it has also brought in its train new and not so satisfactory problems which still remain to be solved. The long controversy concerning *butaka* or clan lands exhibits the tenacity of the old culture and points to an eventual compromise between the two concepts. Out of this compromise, perhaps, will grow something new that will balance individual and communal claims, and it is this possibility which is undoubtedly the most encouraging sign of cultural activity among the present-day Baganda.

J. H. DRIBERG.

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